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Abstract
The diversification of the embedded market has led the once single-purpose built embedded
device to become a broader concept that can accommodate more general-purpose solutions,
by widening its hardware and software resources. A huge diversity in system resources and
requirements has boosted the investigation around virtualization technology, which is becoming
prevalent in the embedded systems domain, allowing timing and spatial sharing of hardware and
software resources between specialized subsystems. As strict timing demands imposed in real-
time virtualized systems must be met, coupled with a small margin for the penalties incurred
by conventional software-based virtualization, resort to hardware-assisted solutions has become
indispensable.
Although not a virtualization but security-oriented technology, Arm TrustZone is seen by many
as a reliable hardware-based virtualization alternative, with the low cost and high spread of
TrustZone-enabled processors standing as strong arguments for its acceptance. But, since Trust-
Zone only dictates the hardware infrastructure foundations, providing SoC designers with a range
of components that can fulfil specific functions, several key-components and subsystems of this
technology are implementation defined. This approach may hinder a system designer’s work, as
it may impair and make the portability of system software a lot more complicated.
As such, this thesis proposes to examine how different manufacturers choose to work with
the TrustZone architecture, and how the changes introduced by this technology may affect the
security and performance of TrustZone-assisted virtualization solutions, in order to scale back
those major constraints. It identifies the main properties that impact the creation and execution
of system software and points into what may be the most beneficial approaches for developing
and using TrustZone-assisted hardware and software.
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Resumo
A recente metamorfose na área dos sistemas embebidos transformou estes dispositivos,
outrora concebidos com um único e simples propósito, num aglomerado de subsistemas prontos
para integrar soluções mais flexíveis. Este aumento de recursos e de requisitos dos sistemas
potenciou a investigação em soluções de virtualização dos mesmos, permitindo uma partilha
simultânea de recursos de hardware e software entre os vários subsistemas. A proliferação destas
soluções neste domínio, onde os tempos de execução têm de ser respeitados e a segurança é
um ponto-chave, tem levado à adoção de técnicas de virtualização assistidas por hardware.
Uma tecnologia que tem vindo a ser utilizada para este fim é a Arm TrustZone, apesar de
inicialmente ter sido desenvolvida como uma tecnologia de proteção, dado a sua maior presença
em placas de médio e baixo custo quando comparada a outras tecnologias. Infelizmente, dado
que a TrustZone apenas fornece diretrizes base sobre as quais os fabricantes podem contruir
os seus sistemas, as especificações da tecnologia divergem de fabricante para fabricante, ou
até entre produtos com a mesma origem. Aliada à geral escassez de informação sobre esta
tecnologia, esta característica pode trazer problemas para a criação e portabilidade de software
de sistema dependente desta tecnologia.
Como tal, a presente tese propõe examinar, de uma forma sistematizada, de que forma difer-
entes fabricantes escolhem implementar sistemas baseados na arquitetura TrustZone e em que
medida as mudanças introduzidas por esta tecnologia podem afetar a segurança e desempenho
de soluções de virtualização baseadas na mesma. São identificadas as principais características
que podem influenciar a criação e execução de software de sistema e potenciais medidas para
diminuir o seu impacto, assim como boas práticas a seguir no desenvolvimento na utilização de
software e hardware baseados na TrustZone.
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1. Introduction
The diversification of the embedded market, prompted by the expansion of industries such
as consumer electronics and the more recent incursion of Internet-of-Things solutions, has led
the once single-purpose built embedded device to become a broader concept. These platforms
can now accommodate more general-purpose solutions by widening its hardware and software
resources. Furthermore, coupling multiple subsystems in the same platform does not only reduce
costs, by promoting resource sharing among components, but also increases performance, as
the tightly coupled subsystems can communicate a lot faster.
As a way of consolidating the multiple isolated subsystems into the same hardware platform,
virtualization technology is becoming prevalent in the embedded systems domain, allowing timing
and spatial resource sharing between subsystems by enabling the implementation of heteroge-
neous software environments into the same platform. This trend can be seen in industries such
as the automotive industry, where real-time, safety-critical functionalities are integrated with the
infotainment environment (Kim et al., 2013, Lee et al., 2016, Reinhardt and Morgan, 2014), or
the aerospace industry, where virtualization provides isolation for safety-critical components (Mas-
mano et al., 2009, Pinto et al., 2016b). In both cases, a Real-time Operating System (RTOS) and
a General Purpose Operating System (GPOS) are each encapsulated in what is called a Virtual
Machine (VM), which has a virtualized view of the system resources. This resource abstraction
allows monitoring software—a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM)—to manage VM communication to
system components and among each other, in order to guarantee timing and spatial isolation
between VMs. As strict timing demands imposed in real-time virtualized systems must be met,
coupled with a small margin for the penalties incurred by conventional software-based virtualiza-
tion, resort to hardware-assisted solutions is imperative and becoming the norm.
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
Among existing commercial of-the-shelf (COTS) technologies, such as Intel’s Virtualization
Technology (VT), Arm Virtualization Extensions (VE) and Arm TrustZone (TZ), the latter is assert-
ing itself in the virtualization realm. Although not a virtualization but security-oriented technology,
TrustZone is seen by many as a reliable hardware-based virtualization alternative (Frenzel et al.,
2010, Pinto et al., 2019, 2016a, 2017b, Sangorrin et al., 2010). The lower cost and higher spread
of TrustZone-enabled processors, in comparison with VE-enabled processors, along with the fact
that TrustZone is considered the only implementable hardware-based virtualization approach on
non-VE Arm processors, are standing as strong arguments for this solution’s acceptance. More-
over, due to the introduction of TrustZone technology in the new generation of Cortex-M processors
(ARM, 2017b), the technology is poised to make its mark in the low-end sector (Pinto et al., 2019),
revealing the prospect for virtualization in embedded devices that are more resource-constrained.
As System on Chip (SoC) manufacturers continue to develop TrustZone compliant devices,
this technology is becoming ingrained in the embedded market (ARM, 2018c). But, since Trust-
Zone only provides the hardware infrastructure foundations, allowing a SoC designer to choose
from a range of components that can fulfil specific functions within the target environment (ARM,
2009b), it means that a lot of the technology is implementation defined. This approach may
hinder a system designer’s work, as it may impair and make the portability of system software
(Operating Systems, Hypervisors) developed with this technology a lot more complicated since,
for example, different target platforms may provide more or less options to control its memory
subsystem, as well as lead to some design idiosyncrasies that should be accounted for (Zhang
et al., 2016a). As such, it is important to examine how different manufacturers choose to work
with the TrustZone architecture, in order to scale back those major constraints.
1.1 Motivation
This master’s thesis was developed to help shed some light into the TrustZone world, mainly
the memory subsystem, of which information is rather scarce and superficial. With the current
existence of TrustZone-enabled virtualization solutions, it becomes relevant to take a step back
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and evaluate how the implementation-defined facet of this technology may influence the devel-
opment of these solutions, as well as answering some questions that are left pending by the
available TrustZone literature. Developed within the Embedded System Research Group (ESRG)
of the University of Minho, it takes advantage of the existence of an in-house TrustZone-assisted
hypervisor, the LTZVisor, and the current porting efforts for its deployment in various development
boards, to evaluate the diversity and intricacies of the TrustZone memory subsystem in different
platforms.
1.2 Goals
The main goals of this thesis are to survey and identify the main differences in separate
implementations of TrustZone-aware memory subsystems, and how these may impact the ex-
ecution and porting of system software. Furthermore it intends to study the impact that some
design choices of this technology may have on the security and performance of TrustZone-assisted
virtualization environments.
To accomplish these goals, a smaller set of objectives can be laid out:
• Study of the Arm architecture and TrustZone-assisted virtualization, for a better contextu-
alization of the research environment;
• Review and evaluation of different SoC implementations of TrustZone memory subsystems,
identifying the main attributes whose variance most influences the development of system
software;
• Review and evaluation of the TrustZone modifications to the cache architecture, its benefits
and drawbacks to the implementation of virtualized environments.
After the initial study, the evaluation of the different approaches designers follow when build-
ing a system that complies with the TrustZone architecture will identify the advantages they bring
over each other and the drawbacks associated with each one. The targeted platforms (Xilinx Zynq-
7000, Xilinx Zynq Ultrascale +, RaspberryPi3, i.MX6) are representative of different price ranges
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from big-name manufacturers/vendors in the embedded market (EETimes and Embedded.com,
2017), which provide a somewhat broad view of the embedded landscape.
1.3 Document Structure
Including this introductory chapter that contextualizes the motivation behind the work, this
document is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 presents the underlying concepts necessary to
the development of this thesis, reviewing the virtualization concept, Arm’s architectural features
as well as the TrustZone extensions and their use in the deployment of virtualization solutions.
Chapter 2 concludes by shortly reviewing some works that helped identify some of the questions
this thesis aims to answer. Chapter 3 presents the hardware platforms that were subject to evalu-
ation and the runtime environment, LTZVisor, that was deployed in those platforms to perform the
review of the different implementations. Chapters 4 and 5 present the results of the surveying
processes of the main memory subsystem of the selected boards and TrustZone’s cache-level
implementations, respectively. Chapter 6 displays the main summary of the results drawn in the
two preceding chapters, bringing together the conclusions from both angles, providing a more
holistic view of the impacts they may present.
2. Background and Related Work
This chapter exposes the most pertinent subjects for the development of this thesis and
reviews works that are closely related to the core of research. The concept of virtualization is
introduced, followed by an overview of the Arm architecture and the Arm TrustZone extensions.
Some works that provide an overview of the TrustZone technology are then reviewed for a deeper
contextualization of this thesis focus.
2.1 Virtualization
Virtualization can be seen as the emulation of a host system into multiple isolated virtual
machines (VMs) which mimic the behaviour of the host. A VMM, also known as an hypervisor, is
responsible for configuring and maintaining the VM environment, running at the highest privilege
level and multiplexing accesses from the VMs to the hosting system resources.
Despite being around since the 60’s, it was not until a couple of decades ago that virtualiza-
tion became a relevant topic in both research and commercial environments. Initially developed
as a way to improve utilization of hardware resources on platforms that previously could only run
a single application/Operating System at a time (Graziano, 2011), virtualization got out of focus
for the research community when the availability of multitasking and multi-user OSes became
more widespread. Its resurgence took place when, mainly in the increasingly connected world of
desktop and server domains, challenges of resource management and isolation became a con-
cern that prompted research for a better solution than fixing all scalability bottlenecks present in
general purpose OSes (Kauer, 2014). Using virtualization to tackle this problem allows concur-
rent execution of multiple VMs to increase the utilization rates of underlying resources while also
5
6 Chapter 2. Background and Related Work
providing VM isolation and encapsulation. Isolation ensures that concurrent VMs cannot tamper
with each others data/execution flow while encapsulation allows saving of a VMs current state,
making it possible to run at another time or even in a different host machine. Figure 2.1 depicts
the architectural differences between the classical approach of single guest per host system and
the virtualized approach in which a single host allows execution of multiple guest VMs.
Host Platform
Guest OS
App
Host Platform
Guest OS
App
Host Platform
Guest OS
App
Host Platform
Guest OS
App
(a) Classical Approach
Virtualization Layer - VMM
Host Platform
VM
Guest OS
App
VM
Guest OS
App
VM
Guest OS
App
VM
Guest OS
App
(b) Virtualization Approach
Figure 2.1: System Stack Approaches
Traditionally, guests are unaware of their virtualization, in an approach called full-virtualization.
This allows running unmodified OSes, which is crucial when dealing with OSes whose source code
is not available but comes with a drawback in terms of performance and increased complexity.
This is due to traditional trap-and-emulate or Dynamic Binary Translation techniques which require
constant execution mode crosses and excessive use of memory resources. The trap-and-emulate
techniques require that the hypervisor identifies when guests attempt to access critical registers
or restricted memory locations, trapping those instructions, and then emulating the effect they
would trigger, without actually executing them on the host, which greatly increases the hypervisor’s
workload.
Differently to full-virtualization, para-virtualization relies on changing guest OSes source code,
introducing hypercalls that implicitly invoke the hypervisor for execution of critical instructions.
This comes at a high engineering cost and is not always a viable solution, given the availability of
Chapter 2. Background and Related Work 7
guest source code, but, when applicable, greatly minimizes the performance overhead imposed
by classical approaches by reducing the hypervisors’ workload. This approach also eases the
process of memory management in a virtualized system since the guests can be aware of their
memory boundaries at compile time and, as such, can prevent accesses to memory locations
that belong to other guests, maintaining the isolation between guest partitions.
Independently of the virtualization approach, it is possible to distinguish two types of hypervi-
sors based on the position of the virtualization layer in the software stack (Figure 2.2):
• Type-1, or bare-metal Hypervisors, have direct access to the hardware layer and manage
the execution permissions of every system component, mediating all hardware accesses.
As a consequence, the performance degradation of guest OSes will only be influenced by
the performance of the Hypervisor itself, making this type of Hypervisor more suited to
systems with strict time constraints.
• Type-2, or hosted Hypervisors, run over a OS that is already executing rather than directly
above the hardware layer. This type of VMM usually does not have permissions to access
and perform any operation on the hardware directly, since those responsibilities usually
rest in the system software that runs below the VMM, leading to lower performance ratings
compared to type-1 Hypervisors.
Hardware
Hypervisor
OS OS OS
(a) Type-1 Hypervisor
Hardware
OS
Hypervisor
OS OS OS
Hypervisor
OS OS OS
(b) Type-2 Hypervisor
Figure 2.2: Hypervisor Classification
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Fulfilling the growing need to consolidate multiple isolated subsystems into the same hardware
platform in fields such as the automotive (Kim et al., 2013, Lee et al., 2016, Reinhardt and Morgan,
2014) and aerospace (Masmano et al., 2009, Pinto et al., 2016c) industries, this shift towards
virtualized environments is also becoming prevalent in the embedded systems world, mainly
through type-1 hypervisors. As the strict timing demands imposed in real-time virtualized systems
must be met, coupled with a small margin for the penalties incurred by conventional software-
based virtualization, resort to hardware-assisted solutions is becoming the norm. Among other
things, virtualization hardware extensions—e.g. Arm’s Virtualization Extensions (VE) (Varanasi
and Heiser, 2011) or Intel’s Virtualization Technology (Uhlig et al., 2005)—reduce overhead in
context switch operations and eliminate some of the trapping of guest accesses by creating a
new hypervisor privilege mode and introducing banking of sensitive registers between execution
modes. Crucially, they also provide two-level address translation hardware support, speeding the
translation from guest-virtual to host-physical address, which is essential when implementing a
full-virtualization environment.
Although these hardware extensions are starting to make their way into the mid to high-
end processors realm, propelled in a big way by the recent proliferation of Arm processors in
this market, it is worth mentioning one other set of more widespread extensions developed by
Arm. The Arm TrustZone extensions, initially deployed with security as its main target, implement
similar register banking between privilege modes and have been shown to provide a virtualization
solution in devices that do not possess hardware virtualization extensions (Frenzel et al., 2010,
Pinto et al., 2017b, Sangorrin et al., 2010), enabling the integration of virtualized environments
in a wider range of platforms.
2.2 Arm Architecture
In the past few years, Arm has helped build the technology that redefined industries ranging
from mobile and consumer devices to networking and servers, cementing its position has a major
force in the embedded market and in the Internet of Things (IoT) world. Arm licenses its processor
architectures and intellectual property (IP) blocks—deployed in silicon to enhance/accelerate, for
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example, security or graphics—to SoC manufacturers wishing to develop reliable and connected
devices. Currently, Arm-based chips account for 39% of the ”chips with processors” market share
and growing, with 90% of the processors in mobile application processors or controllers for IoT
devices being Arm-based (ARM, 2018c).
Previously known as Advanced RISC Machine, Arm represents a family of Reduced Instruc-
tion Set Computing (RISC) architectures which implements a small set of simple and general
instructions, contrasting with a Complex Instruction Set Computing (CISC) architecture, which im-
plements more complex and differentiated instructions. Traditionally, differences between these
architectures allowed for lower cost, power consumption and heat dissipation values in RISC
processors (Blem et al., 2013), fitting the needs of smaller, portable, battery-powered devices
present in the embedded or mobile computing realms. Arm builds up on the base RISC 32-bit
load/store architecture and enhances it by implementing features such as conditional execution
of instructions to reduce branching and improve code density, auto incrementing and decrement-
ing addressing modes that optimize program loops and load/store multiple data instructions to
maximize data throughput (Goodacre and Sloss, 2005). All of these changes, along with the
addiction of the reduced Thumb instruction set optimized for code density, with improved perfor-
mance in narrower 16-bit memory systems, promoted the growth of Arm in the low to mid-end
devices market, which is still prevalent to this day. Arm kept continually improving its architec-
ture, adding new functionalities to the existing ones as the application processors requirements
kept evolving, but maintaining its core characteristics like the different processor modes, general-
purpose registers and program status registers. The most relevant additions to each version of
the base architecture are depicted in Figure 2.3, such as the introduction of Single Instruction
Multiple Data (SIMD) or the TrustZone security extensions and the virtualization extensions (ARM,
2005).
More recently, reflecting Arm’s goal of becoming relevant in different markets which present
distinct challenges and requirements, variations of the base architecture were introduced, to which
Arm called architecture profiles. This differentiation of processor architectures allows manufac-
turers to comply with the current Size, Weight, Power and Cost (SWaP-C) requirements of modern
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Figure 2.3: Arm architecture evolution
devices without compromising performance or determinism in systems where those are crucial.
Chip manufacturers can choose between different profiles for the one which better fits their needs
or even combine them, implementing a flexible system fit for a myriad of applications, without
having the fear of consolidation issues between the modules. Currently, and since the unveiling of
the Armv7 architecture, Arm provides three of these architectural variants and in-house processor
core families called ”Cortex” that are compliant with each of these profiles:
• Application profile: Armv7(8)-A processors, such as Cortex-A cores, implement a tradi-
tional Arm architecture and support a virtual memory system architecture based on a
Memory Management Unit (MMU). This is the highest performance profile, influenced by
multi-tasking OS system requirements, and is usually found in applications such as smart-
phones, tablets and digital televisions.
• Real-time profile: Armv7(8)-R processors, such as Cortex-R cores, implement a traditional
Arm architecture similarly to the previous profile but support a protected memory system
architecture based on an Memory Protection Unit (MPU) instead of the virtual memory
approach followed by ”-A” processors. As with the application processes, they provide
high performance and throughput but with very precise timing and predictable interrupt
latency, making them ideal for deeply embedded time-critical applications.
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• Microcontroller profile: Armv7(8)-M processors, such as Cortex-M cores, implement a pro-
grammers’ model designed for fast interrupt processing, with hardware stacking of regis-
ters and support for writing interrupt handlers in high-level languages. Intended for use in
microcontrollers, they follow a minimalistic implementation when compared to the other
profiles, which allows for low cost and low power values, characteristic of these types of
devices.
As depicted above, these variants are available in both the Armv7 and the latest Armv8 ar-
chitecture which, at the moment, are the two main Arm architectures in the market. Despite
having an enormous presence in the mobile/smartphone industry (ARM, 2018c), the Armv8 ar-
chitecture has not yet hit the embedded market in a meaningful way, where 64-bit devices are not
very widespread, which boost the proliferation of Armv7 devices (EETimes and Embedded.com,
2017).
The following two subsections describe the Armv7-A and Armv8-A architectures, for a better
understanding of the Arm architecture for application profiles, as these are the two architectures
present in the boards subject to evaluation, in the form of Cortex-A9 and Cortex-A53 cores. In
the context of this thesis, the covered subjects are narrowed to the processor modes, register
organization, memory architecture and exception handling of the two architectures.
2.2.1 Armv7-A
Armv7, the seventh version of the 32-bit Arm architecture, was the first version to implement
the distinction between three architectural profiles: the application profile, the real-time profile and
the microcontroller profile. This section focuses on the application profile, Armv7-A, developed fo
high-processing low power applications, such as smartphones or digital televisions, supporting a
virtual memory system based on an MMU. Out of the three profiles, the application profile differs
the least from the previous Armv6 architecture, building upon it while increasing capability and
performance.
The following subsections present an overview of the Armv7-A architecture, in an implemen-
tation that includes both the TrustZone and virtualization extensions. Although the virtualization
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extensions are not considered in the scope of this work, including them here allows a better
comparison with the Armv8-A architecture.
2.2.1.1 Processor Modes
In an implementation that includes both the security and virtualization extensions, the Armv7-
A architecture adds two processor modes to the seven present in Armv6 (ARM, 2005, 2012). The
nine modes—User, System, Supervisor, Abort, Undefined, FIQ, IRQ, Hypervisor and Monitor—are
split between privilege levels and security states. There are three privilege levels—PL0,PL1 and
PL2— orthogonal to the security state, with the exception of the Hypervisor and Monitor modes
which are assigned to the non-secure and secure states, respectively, as displayed in Table 2.1.
The privilege levels refer to the permissions that software running at a certain level has over
system resources in the current security state:
• PL0, where only User Mode runs, is considered the unprivileged level, allowing no access
to system configuration registers. This is usually where OS applications that do not belong
to the kernel run.
• PL1, where software has access to all system resources except for a few virtualization
configuration registers added in the virtualization extensions. This is usually where OS
software is executed. In this level, all modes except monitor mode can run in both security
states.
• PL2, dedicated to the Hypervisor mode, is designed for virtual machine managing soft-
ware and only runs in a non-secure state. Software executing at PL2 can perform all the
operations available at PL1, plus some additional functionalities.
It is important to note that privilege level and security state are two independent concepts.
The security extensions are further explained in section 2.3 but the main note to have present is
that non-secure software cannot change configurations or control settings for secure operations,
even in PL2, but secure software can meddle with non-secure operations. Permissions can be
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Table 2.1: Armv7-A Processor Modes
Processor Mode Privilege Level Security State
User PL0 Both
FIQ PL1 Both
IRQ PL1 Both
Supervisor PL1 Both
Monitor PL1 Secure
Abort PL1 Both
Hypervisor PL2 Non-secure
Undefined PL1 Both
System PL1 Both
assigned: at PL1, for accesses made by PL1 or PL0; at PL2 for non-secure accesses made by
PL2 or non-secure accesses made by PL1 or PL0.
Changing processor mode can be achieved in three different ways: either privilege software
explicitly changes the current processor mode or an exception is being handled or returned from
(See Section 2.2.1.4). Changes from User mode can only occur by causing an exception, which
is handled in a specific mode at a higher level, dependent of system configurations. Entering
Hypervisor mode can only be achieved by taking an exception from non-secure PL0 or PL1 modes
or returning from an exception being handled in Monitor mode. As for the PL1 modes, any of
them can explicitly change the processor mode to another PL1 mode or to User mode.
2.2.1.2 Registers
Armv7-A maintains the general register layout of past versions, with thirteen general-purpose
registers (R0-R12) and a Program Counter (PC) shared among all processor modes—except for
the FIQ mode which has its own R8-R12 registers—, along with a Linker Register (LR), Stack
Pointer (SP) and Saved Program Status Register (SPSR). These last three registers are banked
between almost all processing modes, meaning that each mode has its own physical copy of the
register, as displayed in (ARM, 2012, Figure 2.4), where the white cells represent the registers
which are shared amongst all modes. When an exception is taken, the preferred return address
is transferred to the banked LR register and the CPSR of the mode running when the exception
was triggered is saved in the SPSR of the mode to which the exception was taken. This creates
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Figure B1-2 ARM core registers, PSRs, and ELR_hyp, showing register banking
As described in Processor mode for taking exceptions on page B1-1172, on taking an exception the processor 
changes mode, unless it is already in the mode to which it must take the exception. Each mode that the processor 
might enter in this way has:
• A Banked copy of the stack pointer, for example SP_irq and SP_hyp.
• A register that holds a preferred return address for the exception. This is:
— for each PL1 mode, a Banked copy of the link register, for example LR_und and LR_mon
— for the PL2 mode, Hyp mode, the special register ELR_hyp.
• A saved copy of the CPSR, made on exception entry, for example SPSR_irq and SPSR_hyp.
In addition FIQ mode has Banked copies of the ARM core registers R8 to R12.
User mode and System mode share the same ARM core registers.
User mode, System mode, and Hyp mode share the same LR.
For more information about the application level view of the SP, LR, and PC, and the alternative descriptions of 
them as R13, R14 and R15, see ARM core registers on page A2-45.
Pseudocode details of ARM core register operations
The following pseudocode gives access to the ARM core registers:
// The names of the Banked core registers.
enumeration RName {RName_0usr, RName_1usr, RName_2usr, RName_3usr, RName_4usr, RName_5usr,
                   RName_6usr, RName_7usr, RName_8usr, RName_8fiq, RName_9usr, RName_9fiq,
                   RName_10usr, RName_10fiq, RName_11usr, RName_11fiq, RName_12usr, RName_12fiq,
                   RName_SPusr, RName_SPfiq, RName_SPirq, RName_SPsvc,
                   RName_SPabt, RName_SPund, RName_SPmon, RName_SPhyp,
                   RName_LRusr, RName_LRfiq, RName_LRirq, RName_LRsvc,
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Figure 2.4: Armv7-A Core Registers
an easier mechanism to return from exceptions, relieving the workload of the context restore.
Thes Program Status Registers (PSRs) store informa ion such as the carry and overfl w
condition flags, the endianess, the execution state—Arm, Thumb or Jazelle—and the processor
mode. Other syst m configurations r garding security and virtual emory are controlled through
Arm’s coprocessors, mainly CP15. These are only accessible by software running at PL1, with
variable security permissions—registers can be secure access only, shared between both states,
banked between both states and some have a configurable security access. This separation is
furthe explored in secti n 2.3.
2.2.1.3 Memory Architecture
As previously mentioned, Armv7-A processors implement a Virtual Memory System Architec-
ture (VMSA) based on a MMU, supporting the existenc of level-1 (L1) and level-2 (L2) caches
(ARM, 2012). In a VMSA implementation, all the addresses generated by the processor are Virtual
Addresses (VA), enabling each kernel or user process to run in its own virtual memory space. This
allows the concurrent execution of multiple processes atop of the same physical memory, through
a process of address relocation which translates a virtual address issued by the processor into
a physical address in main memory. In a classical implementation, a multitasking OS manages
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each task’s memory system view, switching the mappings when a task starts executing. In a
virtualized system, in a two-level address translation implementation, another layer is added. So,
the hypervisor manages each guest OS system view which then manages the tasks’ translation
regime. Figure 2.5 helps illustrate this concept—in a non-virtualized system, the guest physical
address space would correspond to the real physical address space and the translation process
would stop there.
Process 1
Virtual 
Address Space 
Process 2
Virtual
 Address Space 
Guest
Physical
Address 
Space
Guest OS
Process 1
Virtual 
Address Space 
Process 2
Virtual
 Address Space 
Guest
Physical
Address 
Space
Guest OS
Physical
Address 
Space
Hypervisor
Virtual Addresses
 (VA)
Intermediate
 Physical Address
(IPA)
 Physical Address
(PA)
Figure 2.5: Two-level Address Translation
The unit responsible for this translation process between the virtual memory view and the real
physical memory addresses is the MMU. Carried out by the MMU hardware, this process is trans-
parent to the task issuing the virtual addresses, meaning that the task needs no knowledge of the
underlying physical memory system mapping or the mappings used by other tasks. To translate
these addresses, the MMU uses a set of translation tables which contain the mappings between
virtual and physical addresses, along with memory access permissions and cache policies for
each region of memory. When a virtual address is issued, the MMU uses the information in the
translation tables to check if the access is valid and, if so, return the corresponding physical ad-
dress, in a process called translation table walking. As these translation tables are usually stored
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in main memory, which take some time to access, Arm implements a set of ”translation caches”,
called Translation Lookaside Buffers (TLBs), which store recently executed translations. This ac-
cess hierarchy is represented in (ARM, 2014, Figure 2.6). Note that the Caches block displayed in
the figure may hold entries from the translation tables and not the result of the translation itself,
which can only be cached in the TLBs.
The Memory Management Unit 
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9.1 Virtual memory
The MMU enables you to build systems with multiple virtual address maps. Each task can have 
its own virtual memory map. The OS kernel places code and data for each application in 
physical memory, but the application itself does not require the location.
The address translation carried out by the MMU is done using translation tables. These are 
tree-shaped table data structures created by software in memory, that the MMU hardware 
traverses to accomplish virtual address translation. 
Note
 In the ARM architecture, the concept referred to in generic computer terminology as page tables 
has a more specific meaning. The ARM architecture uses multi-level page tables, and defines 
translation tables as a generic term for all of these. An entry in a translation table contains all 
the information required to translate a page in virtual memory to a page in physical memory. 
The specific mechanism of traversal and the table format are configurable by software and are 
explained later.
Translation table entries are organized by virtual address. In addition to describing the 
translation of that virtual page to a physical page, they also provide access permissions and 
memory attributes ne essary for that page.
Figure 9-2 The Memory Management Unit
Addresses generated by the core are virtual addresses. When the MMU is enabled all memory 
accesses made by the core pass through it. The MMU essentially replaces the most significant 
bits of this virtual address with some other value, to generate the physical address (effectively 
defining a base address of a piece of memory).The same translation tables are used to define the 
translations and memory attributes that apply to both instruction fetches and to data accesses. 
Dedicated hardware within the MMU enables it to read the translation tables in memory. This 
process is known as translation table walking.
9.1.1 Configuring and enabling the MMU
Before the MMU is enabled, the translation tables must be written to memory. The TTBR 
register must be set to point to the tables. The following code sequence can then be used to 
enable the MMU:
MRC p15, 0, R1, c1, C0, 0 ;Read control register
ORR R1, #0x1 ;Set M bit
MCR p15, 0,R1,C1, C0,0 ;Write control register and enable MMU
Care must be taken if enabling the MMU changes the address mapping of the region in which 
code is currently being executed. Barriers (See Memory barriers on page 10-6) may be 
necessary to ensure correct operation.
ARM Core Caches
TLBs Table Walk Unit
MMU
Translation 
tables
Memory
Figure 2.6: VMSA Access Hierarchy
Armv7-A, as a 32-bit architecture, spans a 4GB addressable physical space. Stage-1 trans-
latio tables, which transl te virtual to physical addresses, spli this 4GB into 4096 equal sized
sections, each describing 1MB block of virtual memory space. Each of these 32-bit sized entries
can describe pages of four different sizes: a supersection (16MB block of memory), a section
(1MB block of memory), a large page (64KB block of memory) or a small page (4KB block of
memory). The supersection and section entries define the base address of a contiguous 16 or
1MB section, respectively. On the other hand, small or large page entries point to a level 2 trans-
lation table, which allows subdividing a 1MB region into smaller pages, as displayed in Figure 2.7.
The levels of translation tables should not be confused with the stages of translation where stage-1
refers to virtual to intermediate physical address translations (VA-IPA) and stage-2 to intermediate
physical to physical address translations (IPA-PA).
Setting the base address of the stage-1 translations tables is done by writing to the Translation
Table Base Register (TTBR), for stage-1 translations in every mode other than the hypervisor mode.
For stage-1 translations from hypervisor mode, the Hypervisor Translation Table Base Register
(HTTBR) is used. The stage-2 translation table base address is set by the Virtualization Translation
Table Base Register (VTTBR), which is only accessible from hypervisor mode or monitor mode.
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Figure B3-3 gives a general view of address translation when using the Short-descriptor translation table format.
Figure B3-3 General view of address translation using Short-descriptor format translation tables
Additional requirements for Short-descriptor format translation tables on page B3-1328 describes why, when using 
the Short-descriptor format, Supersection and Large page entries must be repeated 16 times, as shown in 
Figure B3-3.
Short-descriptor translation table format descriptors, Memory attributes in the Short-descriptor translation table 
format descriptors on page B3-1328, and Control of Secure or Non-secure memory access, Short-descriptor format 
on page B3-1330 describe the format of the descriptors in the Short-descriptor format translation tables.
The following sections then describe the use of this translation table format:
• Selecting between TTBR0 and TTBR1, Short-descriptor translation table format on page B3-1330
• Translation table walks, when using the Short-descriptor translation table format on page B3-1331.
B3.5.1   Short-descriptor translation table format descriptors 
The following sections describe the formats of the entries in the Short-descriptor translation tables:
• Short-descriptor translation table first-level descriptor formats on page B3-1326
• Short-descriptor translation table second-level descriptor formats on page B3-1327.
For more information about second-level translation tables see Additional requirements for Short-descriptor format 
translation tables on page B3-1328.
Note
 Previous versions of the ARM Architecture Reference Manual, and some other documentation, describes the AP[2] 
bit in the translation table entries as the APX bit.
Information returned by a translation table lookup on page B3-1320 describes the classification of the non-address 
fields in the descriptors as address map control, access control, or attribute fields.
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Figure 2.7: Armv7-A Page Table Layout
With the inclusion of the virtualization extensions, Armv7-A processors present four MMU
interfaces, each with their own enable controls: secure PL1 and PL0 stage-1 MMU is controlled
by the System Control Register MMU bit, SCTLR.M, in the secure copy of the register; non-secure
PL1 and PL0 stage-1 MMU is controlled by SCTLR.M, in the non-secure copy of the register;
non-secure PL1 and PL0 stage-2 MMU is controlled by the Hypervisor Configuration Register,
HCR.VM, accessible only at PL2; non-secure PL2 stage-1 MMU is controlled by the Hypervisor
System Control Register, HSCTLR.M, also only accessible at PL . Disabling any of these instances
means that the generated address remains unaltered but does not guarantee that the memory
attributes or permissions are not set (ARM, 2012).
Latest versions of t e Armv7-A architecture pecification also i troduc d the Large Physical
Address Extensions (LPAE), to support higher levels of device integration on a single memory
and space under a single address space (ARM, 2011b). This allows the mapping of multiple
32-bit virtual address spaces into up to a 40-bit physical address space, solving some of the 4GB
limitations present in 32-bit addressable systems.
2.2.1.4 Exception Handling
An exception causes the processor to suspend program execution to handle an event, such
as an externally generated interrupt or an attempt to execute an undefined instruction. When an
exception is taken in Armv7-A, the processor state is immediately preserved, before handling the
exception, so that the original state can be restored upon exception return. This concept was
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introduced in Section 2.2.1.1, where the linker register, stack pointer and SPSR were saved upon
entering a new processing mode.
In this exception model, five types of exceptions are defined: reset, undefined instructions,
system calls, memory aborts and interrupts. Arm takes these five types and implements nine
different exceptions, incorporated in the security and virtualization extensions:
• Reset: When the reset input is asserted, the processor stops execution until that input
is no longer driven. Execution is then resumed in secure Supervisor mode at the proper
address defined in SCTLR.V.
• Undefined Instruction: Occurs whenever an instruction with undefined or invalid behavior
tries to execute. This illegal execution can be the result of disabled coprocessor operations
or unimplemented instructions for the current instruction set state.
• Supervisor Call (SVC): This instruction explicitly launches an exception that causes the
processor to enter Supervisor mode. Typically, the SVC instruction is executed to request
an operating system function.
• Secure Monitor Call (SMC): Part of the security extensions, this instruction causes the
processor to enter Monitor mode.
• Hypervisor Call (HVC): Implemented with the virtualization extensions, the HVC instruction
causes the processor to enter Hypervisor mode.
• Prefetch Abort: Triggered by a memory abort on an instruction fetch, usually generated by
the MMU permission checking. By default this exception is taken to Abort mode but can
be modified to change into Monitor or Hypervisor modes.
• Data Abort: Taken on a read or write memory access abort generated by the MMU or
when a memory access external to the core generates an access error, such as a TrustZone
security error. As with the Prefetch Abort, it can be handled in Abort, Monitor or Hypervisor
modes.
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• IRQ: Triggered by asserting an IRQ interrupt request input to the processor. Similar to the
Abort exceptions, it is taken by default to the IRQ mode but can also be handled in Monitor
or Hypervisor modes.
• FIQ: Alike the IRQ exception, it is triggered by asserting an IRQ interrupt request input to
the processor and can also be handled in FIQ, Monitor or Hypervisor modes, depending
on system configuration.
Out of all the exceptions mentioned above, it is important to note that the IRQ, FIQ and Data
Abort exceptions can bemasked using the Current Program Status Register. Masking themmeans
that those exceptions will not be taken until they are no longer masked, which is useful when
executing critical tasks that demand determinism and isolation. There is also another exception
which has not been mentioned yet, the Hyp Trap. This is reserved for the virtualization extensions
and is only taken when non-secure software running in any mode other than Hypervisor mode
executes an instruction that traps in Hypervisor mode.
Handling exceptions in Armv7-A forces execution to an address that corresponds to the type
of exception, referred to as the exception vector of that exception (ARM, 2012). These exception
vectors are organized in four vector tables, assigned to the Hypervisor mode, the Monitor mode
and the Secure and Non-secure states of the PL1. Each of these tables contains eight entries
corresponding to specific exceptions’ exception vector, organized as displayed in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Armv7-A Exception Vector Tables
Offset Hypervisor Monitor Secure Non-secure
0x00 — — Reset —
0x04 Undefined Inst. — Undefined Inst. Undefined Inst.
0x08 HVC SMC SVC SVC
0x0C Prefetch Abort Prefetch Abort Prefetch Abort Prefetch Abort
0x10 Data Abort Data Abort Data Abort Data Abort
0x14 Hyp Trap — — —
0x18 IRQ IRQ IRQ IRQ
0x1C FIQ FIQ FIQ FIQ
Usually a system programmer writes a branch instruction at these addresses that jumps to
a more complex handler of the exception being taken. The base address to which these offsets
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are relative to is saved in variations of the Vector Base Address Register (VBAR). The secure and
normal worlds have banked copies of this register, accessible at PL1, while the HVBAR and the
MVBAR respectively hold the Hypervisor and Monitor exception vector tables base address.
2.2.2 Armv8-A
Armv8 is the latest version of the Arm architecture and the first to implement a 64-bit archi-
tecture. The introduction of the Armv8-A architecture does not intend to tackle current limitations
in application processors but to pave the way for designs that will support tomorrow’s applications
(ARM, 2017a). As previously mentioned, contemporary solutions in the embedded market still
heavily rely on the Armv7-A architecture, boosted by the addition of the Large Physical Address
Extensions which help solve the limitations of 4GB physical address spaces. As with all version of
its architecture, Arm tries to maintain as much backwards compatibility possible, easing porting
efforts to the new architectures. The two execution states implemented in Armv8-A are a reflection
of this view:
• Aarch32 retains the Armv7 32-bit approach and maintains its definitions of privilege levels,
allowing the execution of A32 or Thumb instruction sets.
• Aarch64 introduces the A64 instruction set with 64-bit general-purpose registers along with
a new approach to privileged execution.
The following sections will focus on the innovations introduced in Armv8-A and, as such, are
centered around the Aarch64 execution state. The division between these topics is homologous to
the one made in the Armv7-A review, to facilitate a comparison between the two. As with section
2.2.1, matters such as the instruction set and interrupt management are not covered, as they are
out of the scope for the development of this thesis.
2.2.2.1 Exception Levels
One of the biggest changes introduced in Armv8-A is the refactoring of the privileged execution
model. When the virtualization extensions were introduced to Armv7-A, with the addiction of PL2,
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separation of mode and privilege level became even more confusing than with the addition of
monitor mode in TrustZone. As displayed in (ARM, 2015, Figure 2.8), monitor mode, used for
switching between the secure and normal worlds, was the most privileged execution mode in
Armv7-A but ran at the same privilege level as all other ”privileged modes”. Being placed in PL1
and with more privilege than PL2 was also counter-intuitive, not very clear from a numbering
standpoint.
User Mode
Normal World Secure World
System mode
Supervisor mode
FIQ mode
IRQ mode
Undefined mode
Abort mode
Hypervisor mode
User Mode
System mode
Supervisor mode
FIQ mode
IRQ mode
Undefined mode
Abort mode
Monitor Mode
PL1
PL2
PL1
PL0
Figure 2.8: Armv7-A Privilege Levels
With the introduction of Armv8-A, monitor mode evolved into an exception level, EL3, with
its own memory translation regime and interrupt vectors. This allowed for cleaner separation of
code, making it easier to provide separate binary images for switching and service implementation
(ARM, 2018b). This change into exception levels was also translated to the other processor modes,
which disappear in Armv8-A, while the previous implemented privilege levels are translated into
the new exception level model:
• EL0, where non-privileged software runs, usually refers to user-level applications of an OS.
• EL1, where OS kernel management and operations execute, in a privileged manner.
• EL2, reserved for the execution of an hypervisor, solely implemented in non-secure state.
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• EL3, where the Secure Monitor now resides, in charge of switching between secure and
normal worlds.
A typical software stack for systems deployed in Armv8-A processors is represented in (ARM,
2015, Figure 2.9), where the privilege hierarchy and separation is well defined and easily com-
prehended from an holistic point of view. As with Armv7-A, the now exception levels refer to the
permissions that software running at a certain level has over system resources in the current
security state. This applies to all ELs except the EL2 which can only access non-secure resources
and the EL3 which can access all system resources at all time.
Application
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Guest OS
Hypervisor
Trusted Application
Trusted OS
Secure Monitor
EL1
EL2
EL3
EL0 Application
Guest OS
Figure 2.9: Armv8-A Exception Levels
Changes to the current exception level can be divided into two categories: raising to a higher
privilege level or lowering to a less privileged level. Transitions to a higher exception level can only
be achieved when handling an exception. These exceptions can either be the result of an internal
or external event or through explicit execution of one of three system calls: a Supervisor Call (SVC),
an Hypervisor Call (HVC) or a Secure Monitor Call (SMC). Supervisor calls are used by software
running in EL0 to trigger a raise to EL1 and are usually executed by user applications wishing
to use specific OS services. Hypervisor calls can be executed by software running in non-secure
EL1, raising the exception level to EL2. Secure Monitor calls can be issued by software running at
either EL1 or EL2, triggering a switch to EL3. SMC can also be trapped into EL2 when executed
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from non-secure EL1 if the HCR_EL2.TSC bit is set. Transitions to a lower exception level are
the result of executing an ERET instruction which restores the execution state according to the
Saved Program Status Register (SPSR). As with Armv7-A, this register saves the current processor
state—condition flags, executions state, exception level— when an exception is taken and, along
with the linker register storing the address to return to, enables a quick context restoring process.
2.2.2.2 Registers
The shift to 64-bit processing and elimination of processor modes is reflected in the register
organization changes introduced in Armv8-A. The new architecture is supported by thirty one 64-
bit general purpose registers which are common to every exception level. In order to maintain
compatibility with the Aarch32 execution mode, each of these registers can be accessed in one
of two ways with the usage of a prefix. Using the ”X” prefix gives access to the full 64-bit register
while accesses executed with the ”W” prefix can only affect the least significant thirty two bits of
that register. As such, these registers range from X0-X30 or W0-W30, depending on the pretended
address resolution. Out of the thirty general purpose registers, Arm’s Application Binary Interface
(ABI) for the 64-bit architecture defines X0-X7 as argument registers, doubling the amount of
registers available for passing parameters in comparison to Armv7-A, reducing the need to spill
parameters to the stack (ARM, 2017a, Figure 2.10). Registers X29 and X30 are also defined
as the Frame Pointer register (FP) and Link Register (LR). None of these registers are banked
between exception levels, which means that saving the general purpose register context between
exception levels must be explicitly done by software.
Apart from these registers, Armv8-A also implement a set of ”special registers” (ARM, 2017a,
Figure 2.11). Two of them, the program counter (PC) and the zero register (XZR,WZR), are shared
among all exception levels. The program counter in Armv8-A shifts away from the Armv7-A im-
plementation, where it was considered a general purpose register, and is no longer accessible
for explicit operations. The zero register is a register that reads as zero when used as a source
register and discards the result when used as a destination register. Remaining special registers
are split among the exception levels. Any of the Saved Program Status Registers (SPSR_ELx) can
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Figure 9-1 General-purpose register use in the ABI
9.1.2 Indirect result location
To reiterate, the X8 (XR) register is used to pass the indirect result location. Here is some code:
//test.c//
struct struct_A
{
int i0;
int i1;
double d0;
double d1;
} AA;
struct struct_A foo(int i0, int i1, double d0, double d1)
{
struct struct_A A1;
A1.i0 = i0;
A1.i1 = i1;
A1.d0 = d0;
A1.d1 = d1;
return A1;
}
void bar()
{
AA = foo(0, 1, 1.0, 2.0);
}
and that can be compiled using:
armclang -target aarch64-arm-none-eabi -c test.c
fromelf-c test.o
X16 (IP0)
X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6
X7
X8 (XR)
X9
X10
X11
X12
X13
X14
X15
Frame pointer
Procedure Link register
Parameter and 
result registers
Indirect result 
location register
X17 (IP1)
X18 (PR)
X19
X20
X21
X22
X23
X24
X25
X26
X27
X28
X29 (FP)
X30 (LR)
Caller saved 
temporary 
registers
Intra-procedure 
call scratch 
registers
Platform register
Callee saved  
registers
Figure 2.10: Armv8-A General-Purpose Regist s
be accessed in any exception level equal or above the ”x” level. For example, SPSR_EL1 can be
accessed at EL1, EL2 and EL3 but not at EL0. EL0 does not possess a SPSR or a ELR since these
registers are used to restore processor state when returning from an exceptions, which does not
happen at EL0. As for the stack pointer, in any EL except EL0 both the current EL stack pointer
or the SP_EL0 can be chosen as the stack pointer.
ARMv8 Registers 
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4.1 AArch64 special registers
In addition to the 31 core registers, there ar  also several special registers. 
Figure 4-3 AArch64 special registers
Note
 There is no register called X31 or W31. Many instructions are encoded such that the number 31 
represents the zero register, ZR (WZR/XZR). There is also a restricted group of instructions 
where one or more of the arguments are encoded such that number 31 represents the Stack 
Pointer (SP).
When accessing the zero register, all writes are ignored and all reads return 0. Note that the 
64-bit form of the SP register does not use an X prefix.
In the ARMv8 architecture, when executing in AArch64, the exception return state is held in the 
following dedicated registers for each Exception level:
• Exception Link Register (ELR). 
• Saved Processor State Register (SPSR).
There is a dedicated SP per Exception level, but it is not used to hold return state.
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Table 4-1 Special registers in AArch64
Name Size Description
WZR 32 bits Zero register
XZR 64 bits Zero register
WSP 32 bits Current stack pointer
SP 64 bits Current stack pointer
PC 64 bits Program counter
Table 4-2 Special registers by Exception level
EL0 EL1 EL2 EL3
Stack Pointer (SP) SP_EL0 SP_EL1 SP_EL2 SP_EL3
Exception Link Register (ELR) ELR_EL1 ELR_EL2 ELR_EL3
Saved Process Status Register (SPSR) SPSR_EL1 SPSR_EL2 SPSR_EL3
Figure 2.11: Armv8-A Special Registers
Regarding system configuration, which was previously controlled through the use of copro-
cessors, mainly CP15, Armv8-A implements different system registers throughout the execution
levels that control various configurations. Akin to the special registers mentioned above, system
register’s names are extended with ”_ELx” which indicates the lowest exception level at which
a register can be accessed. Some registers only exist in certain exception levels, but are still
extended with the same suffix, such as the SRC_EL3 register or virtualization registers tagged
with the EL2 suffix. It is also important to note that even though a register may only differ in the
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ELx suffix, functionalities of system registers assigned to lower exception levels do not have, most
of the times, as many functionalities as the ones only accessible at higher exception levels.
2.2.2.3 Memory Architecture
The Virtual Memory System Architecture of an Armv8-A processor is, from a top-level view-
point, similar to an Armv7-A processor implementation with virtualization and large physical ad-
dress extensions, given the presence of two-level translation support and capability for physical
address mapping above 4GB. Although implementing some different granule sizes and address-
able bit depths, the main differences arise with the addition of the exception levels and in nomen-
clature standardization to minimize confusion.
In Armv7-A, monitor mode, which ran at PL1, had the same system view as any other pro-
cessor mode running at PL1 in a secure state. The translation table base register (TTBR) used
for stage-1 translations was banked between the secure and normal worlds but common to all
processor modes. In Armv8-A, the base address for stage-1 translation tables are given by the
TTBR0_EL1 or TTBR1_EL1 registers, which can be used by processes running at EL0 or EL1.
Now supporting a 48-bit physical address memory map, selection between these two registers
is based on the first sixteen bits of the 64-bit virtual address generated by the processor, which
must be all 0s or 1s, otherwise triggering a fault (ARM, 2015). In AArch64 these registers are not
banked between the secure and normal worlds and, as such, secure monitor code must manage
tables for the both worlds, saving and restoring copies of TTBR0_EL1 and TTBR1_EL1. As for the
stage-2 translations, which convert an intermediate physical address to a physical address, an ex-
tra set of tables is used, under control of the hypervisor. These only apply to non-secure EL0/EL1
accesses made by VMs managed by the VMM. The base register for the stage-2 translation ta-
ble is specified in the Virtualization Translation Table Base Register (VTTBR0_EL2). The overall
Armv8-A VMSA architecture is illustrated in (ARM, 2015, Figure 2.12), where the possible trans-
lation regime hierarchies are displayed along with the registers which configure the translation
tables base addresses.
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12.6 Translations at EL2 and EL3
The virtualization extensions to the ARMv8-A architecture introduce a second stage of 
translation. When a hypervisor is present in the system, one or more guest operating systems 
might be present. These continue to use TTBRn_EL1 as previously described and MMU 
operation appears unchanged.
The hypervisor must perform some extra translation steps in a two stage process to share the 
physical memory system between the different guest operating systems. In the first stage, a 
Virtual Address (VA) is translated to an Intermediate Physical Address (IPA). This is usually 
under OS control. A second stage, controlled by the hypervisor, then performs translation of the 
IPA to the final Physical Address (PA).
The hypervisor and Secure monitor also have their set of stage 1 translation tables for their own 
code and data, which perform mapping directly from VA to PA.
Note
 The Architecture Reference Manual uses the term Translation Regimes to refer to these different 
tables.
Figure 12-15 summarizes this two stage translation process. 
Figure 12-15 Two stage translation process
The stage 2 translations, which convert an intermediate physical address to a Physical Address, 
use an extra set of tables under control of the hypervisor. These must be explicitly enabled by 
writing to the Hypervisor Configuration Register HCR_EL2. This process only applies to 
Non-secure EL1/0 accesses. 
The base address of this stage 2 translation table is specified in the Virtualization Translation 
Table Base Register VTTBR0_EL2. It specifies a single contiguous address space at the bottom 
of memory. The size of the supported address space is specified in the TSZ[5:0] field of the 
Virtualization Translation Control Register, VTCR_EL2. 
The TG field of this register specifies the granule size while the SL0 field controls the first level 
of table lookup. Any access outside the defined address range causes a translation fault.
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Figure 2.12: Armv8-A VMSA
Apart from stage-1 translations from EL0/EL1 or stage-2 translations, another two translation
tables are implemented in Armv8-A. Hypervisor EL2 a d s cure mon tor EL3 stage-1 t nslation
tables are pointed to by TTBR0_EL2 and TTBR0_EL3, respectively. These tables provide the
stage-1 translation regime for s ftwar running in the most privil ged executi modes which
always result in a virtual-to-physical address translation.
2.2.2.4 Exception Handling
Armv8-A maintains the logic behind exception handling mechanisms implemented in Armv7-A
but, with the removal of processor modes and addition of the exception levels, taking exceptions
no longer triggers a processor mode change but an exception level raise. As such, exception
vector tables are implemented in all levels that can handle exceptions, i.e., all levels excluding
EL0. Along with these changes, Armv8-A also reduced the differentiated exception types that
can be handled. In the new model, exceptions can be the result of a reset signal, interrupts
in the form of IRQs or FIQs, aborts, system calls or system errors (SErrors). These types are
further condensed in each exception vector table where each entry can refer to a Synchronous
exception, an IRQ, a FIQ or an SError. Synchronous exceptions include all system calls and the
aborts explicitly resultant of executing an instruction, while SErrors are the result of asynchronous
aborts, usually generated by faulty accesses to main memory. The reset exception is a special
case which is only present in the highest implemented exception level and possesses its own
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handling address, which is stored in the register RVBAR_ELx, where x is the highest implemented
exception level.
Table 2.3 displays the exception vector table for a particular EL, where each entry spans
one-hundred and twenty eight bytes (thirty two instructions). This presents a sizeable increase
over the four byte entries present in Armv7-A which almost always represented some form of
branch instruction to the actual exception handler. The space for thirty two instructions allows
the immediate handling of exceptions but is also useful to determine the source of a synchronous
exception or an SError. In these cases, the Exception Syndrome Register (ESR_ELx) is updated
to indicate if the cause was for example a system call, a data abort or unallocated instruction
execution.
Table 2.3: Armv8-A Exception Vector Tables
Offset Exception Type Description
0x000 Synchronous
Current EL with SP00x080 IRQ/vIRQ0x100 FIQ/vFIQ
0x180 SError/vSError
0x200 Synchronous
Current EL with SP00x280 IRQ/vIRQ0x300 FIQ/vFIQ
0x380 SError/vSError
0x400 Synchronous
Lower EL using AArch640x480 IRQ/vIRQ0x500 FIQ/vFIQ
0x580 SError/vSError
0x600 Synchronous
Lower EL using AArch320x680 IRQ/vIRQ0x700 FIQ/vFIQ
0x780 SError/vSError
As displayed above, the four previously mentioned entry types are mirrored in four sets which
help identifying the execution state when the exception occurred, facilitating the access to the
data of the faulting environment. Exceptions are taken to one of the subsets when: the exception
was triggered on the current EL while using SP0; the exception was triggered on the current EL
while using the SP of the corresponding EL (SPx); the exception was triggered on a lower EL which
was running on the AArch64 execution state or the exception was triggered on a lower EL which
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was running on the AArch32 execution state. With the four exception types available for each
execution environment, the Armv8-A vector tables are comprised of sixteen entries, addressable
by an offset relative to the table’s base address, given by the VBAR_ELx register.
2.3 Arm TrustZone
TrustZone technology represents a set of hardware security extensions that enforce system-
wide secure implementations of Arm-based SoCs by integrating protective measures into the Arm
processor, bus fabric and system peripherals. This system-wide approach of integrated hardware
components provides a framework for securing system architectures to be implemented with
minimal impact on the cost of the end devices (ARM, 2009a, Pinto and Santos, 2019).
Arm introduced the TrustZone extensions in the Armv6Z update to the Armv6 architecture,
and it has since become available in the application profile of Armv7 and Armv8 processors, with
a recent extension to the microcontroller profile of the Armv8 architecture (Pinto et al., 2019).
The security extensions represent Arm’s attempt at creating a trusted environment that is not
constrained to static configurations and allows isolated execution of third party software, in con-
trast to the traditional Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) approach to security (Sabt et al., 2015).
To accomplish this, TrustZone is implemented from the processor down, sort of turning a whole
SoC into a programmable trusted platform module where any part of the system can be secured
(ARM, 2009b).
2.3.1 TrustZone Architecture
The foundation behind TrustZone’s hardware architecture can be seen as a special kind of vir-
tualization approach that provides hardware support for memory, I/O and interrupt virtualization.
At its core, TrustZone relies on the virtualization of a single physical core into two virtual cores, cre-
ating two completely separated execution environments: the secure world and the normal world.
Security is enforced through isolation between both worlds, which is assured by preventing the
normal world from accessing any resource assigned to the secure world and, on the other hand,
allowing the secure world to have access to system resources regardless of their security state.
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Figure 2.13: Arm TrustZone Architecture
This creates a security boundary that allows the containment of untrusted applications by limiting
their access to system resources and, at the same time, allowing secure software to diagnose
and maintain a healthy execution environment.
To manage execution between both worlds, TrustZone extensions add a new processor mode,
monitor mode, which always runs in the secure world and at the most privileged processor exe-
cution level. To switch between worlds, monitor mode must set (or clear) the Non-Secure (NS)
bit in the Secure Configuration Register (SCR), which controls the processor’s current security
state (Figure 2.13). In an implementation that only contains the security extensions, the NS bit
dictates the security state of every processor mode excluding the monitor mode. Differently, when
a processor implements the virtualization extensions, or in an Armv8-A implementation, the NS
bit controls the security state for software running at PL0/PL1, or EL0/EL1. Software running at
PL2/EL2 always runs in the normal world.
Entering monitor mode can be done either through the execution of a Secure Monitor Call
(SMC) instruction or by configuring monitor mode to handle interrupt and abort exceptions trig-
gered in other modes. This relies on the implementation of an extra exception vector table in
monitor mode to complement the vector tables of the secure and normal worlds. The exception
handling separation between worlds, specifically handling of FIQs and IRQs, is also supported
by the General Interrupt Controller (GIC). In a TrustZone environment, the GIC can distinguish
between secure or non-secure interrupts that can be independently routed to each world, while
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also allowing for prioritization of secure interrupts over non-secure interrupts.
The virtualization of the CPU’s system view is mainly supported by the register banking be-
tween both worlds and the distinction between secure and non-secure address spaces. Banked
registers allow each world to have its own copy of a register without the need of saving its state
each time a context switch occurs, further ensuring isolation between both worlds, complemented
with the addition of system registers that manage security policies in the system, such as restrict-
ing non-secure accesses to system configurations. Likewise, the distinction between secure and
non-secure address spaces allows a real physical address to separately exist in these two different
environments. This is accomplished with the addition of a 33rd bit to the addresses issued by the
processor, the NS bit, which indicates the type of access made to a physical memory location: if
the NS bit is clear, the access was made from a secure state; if the NS bit is set, the transaction
that accessed that address was made in a non-secure state. This address tagging is the result of
the translation process between virtual-to-physical addresses performed by the MMU and is also
present in the caches, where the same real physical address can exist in two different cache lines,
one tagged as secure and another tagged as non-secure. This is useful for cache maintenance
purposes but can introduce incoherence to the system (Zhang et al., 2016a), as discussed later
on.
A TrustZone-aware Memory Management Unit (MMU) provides two distinct MMU interfaces,
enabling each world to have a local set of virtual-to-physical memory address translation tables.
This effectively means that the address space can be split into two subsets: a non-secure address
space and a secure address space. Compliant with the TrustZone architecture, non-secure trans-
lation tables can only describe non-secure memory and, as such, only allow non-secure accesses
to memory. Contrarily, secure tables can contain entries that are mapped to either a secure
or non-secure address space, enabling secure world software to make secure or non-secure ac-
cesses.
Since the TrustZone architecture encompasses system wide extensions that go beyond the
processor, connection between system components must also be TrustZone-extended. This can
only be accomplished with a TrustZone-aware bus fabric that can propagate an access’ security
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state (NS bit) throughout the system. As such, the Advanced Microcontroller Bus Architecture
(AMBA) Advanced Extensible Interface (AXI) is extended with a protection bit that signals if a
transaction is secure or non-secure. With this extension, any component with an AXI interface
can become TrustZone-aware. In the case of devices that use a different bus interface that is
not extended with TrustZone capabilities, such as the Advanced Peripheral Bus (APB) used for
low-power device communication, security access can be controlled through an AXI-to-APB bridge
that provides an interface between the high-speed AXI domain and the low-power APB domain.
This bridge includes a input signal for each peripheral connected to the APB bus which is used
to determine if the peripheral is configured as secure or non-secure, rejecting non-secure trans-
actions to devices configured as secure. These signals can be statically configured at synthesis
time or, in conjunction with a TrustZone Protection Controller (TZPC), dynamically controlled at
run-time.
As for securing On-chipmemory (OCM) or external Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM),
whose controllers are AXI-compliant, Arm provides two other system IP instances that enforce
TrustZone extensions. The TrustZone Memory Adapter (TZMA) is a device that allows partition-
ing of an on-SoC static memory into two separate regions: a lower secure region and an upper
non-secure region (ARM, 2006). The TZMA usually works in tandem with a TZPC which drives
the secure region size input used by the TZMA to set the range of protected addresses. When
securing external DDR memory or when there is a need to split a location into more than two
regions, Arm provides the TrustZone Address Space Controller (TZASC). The TZASC can partition
memory into several different secure and non-secure memory regions, using a programming in-
terface which is only accessible from the secure side (ARM, 2008). Figure 2.14 shows how the
security IP provided by TrustZone is usually organized in a traditional SoC implementation.
All of these system IPs are optional and implementation-specific components on the TrustZone
specification, as Arm does not force their implementation in TrustZone aware systems-on-chip.
Unlike the extensions to the processor architecture, SoC manufacturers can choose not to imple-
ment these logical blocks or implement their own versions of them. This is one of the factors
that may hinder the deployment of system software reliant on particular characteristics of these
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components, specially when talking about virtualized systems deployed in platforms which solely
rely on the TrustZone extensions as their virtualization framework.
2.3.2 TrustZone-assisted Virtualization
As discussed in Section 2.1, hardware-assisted virtualization has been present in the em-
bedded systems world for a while now, as hardware support for virtualization enables the de-
ployment of virtualized solutions that meet the real-time requirements of embedded applications.
Virtualization hardware extensions pertinent in the embedded world, such as Arm’s Virtualization
Extensions (Varanasi and Heiser, 2011) or MIPS VZ (Zampiva et al., 2015), add higher privilege
execution modes where a hypervisor can run to manage execution of guest VMs. Removing the
need to trap accesses to system configurations through register banking between hypervisor and
guest modes, along with implementing support for two-level address translations and interrupt
virtualization, these extensions greatly increase the performance of hardware-based virtualization
when compared to classical approaches. Even so, the low availability of boards with these exten-
sions in low-end to mid-range microprocessors prompted researchers to look at the Arm TrustZone
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architecture (Figure 2.15) as a viable virtualization platform.
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Figure 2.15: Arm TrustZone Software Stack
TrustZone does draw a lot of similarities with other hardware-based virtualization technologies
and, even though initially developed as security extensions, it has proved to be a reliable virtu-
alization framework in the embedded world. The addition of a higher privilege mode, above the
unprivileged modes for guest OSes and user applications, which has control over the whole sys-
tem and to which execution can be routed, along with the virtualization of interrupts between both
worlds, mean that TrustZone is a suitable candidate for a hardware-assisted virtualization strat-
egy. Except for the non-existence of hardware support for two-level translations, which hinders
the implementation of full-virtualization environments, TrustZone possesses all the main charac-
teristics of hardware-based virtualization systems, although isolation may be dependent of system
resources. Since the sectioning of memory depends on the implementation of TrustZone periph-
erals, such as the TZASC and the TZMA, this also introduces the need for guests to be specifically
compiled to run in their designed memory segments to maintain spatial isolation among them.
A traditional TrustZone-based virtualization solution relies on the time and spatial isolation fea-
tures between the two worlds to create a VM environment in the normal world which is controlled
by an hypervisor running in the secure world, in a single-guest approach (Figure 2.16). This is
the simplest of the three main current state of the art approaches to TrustZone-assisted virtualiza-
tion which also encompass dual-guest (Kim et al., 2013, Lucas et al., 2017, Pinto et al., 2017b,
Sangorrin et al., 2010) and, more recently, multi-guest (Martins et al., 2017, Pinto et al., 2016b)
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approaches. Despite not having many publicly documented solutions, single-guest approaches
such as the ones presented by Frenzel et al. (Frenzel et al., 2010) or Douglas (Douglas, 2010)
provide a proof of concept for TrustZone-assisted virtualization, implementing a small Trusted
Computing Base (TCB) that secures underlying hardware resources from the execution of non-
secure guests.
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Figure 2.16: Single-Guest Virtualization Typology
The dual-guest approach (Figure 2.17) is the most common TrustZone-assisted virtualization
configuration, as the implementation of two VM environments fits perfectly with the dual world
separation, exploiting the advantages of register banking and isolation at cache level to optimize
performance. This approach has shown to be a great match for mixed-criticality environments
where, usually, a RTOS and a GPOS execute side by side in the same platform. Dual-guest envi-
ronments work by creating a virtual machine (VM) environment in each world, whose execution
is controlled by an hypervisor running in the secure monitor layer. To ensure the timing require-
ments of the RTOS, this operating system runs on the secure VM while the GPOS is deployed
under the non-secure VM environment. Timing isolation between guests is usually enforced by
an asymmetric scheduling policy that only allows the GPOS to run when the RTOS is in an idle
state. Furthermore, the GIC is usually set to configure non-secure interrupts to be handled as
IRQs and secure interrupts as FIQs. In terms of memory and device partitioning, this process is
usually configured at boot time, which imposes slight changes in the RTOS source code, to pre-
vent mismatches with the hypervisor configurations. As for the cache and MMU management,
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given that the two worlds posses different views of the memory subsystem, the need for context
switch operations to enforce isolation is removed, as the separation is intrinsic to the cached
accesses.
The more prominent dual-guest TrustZone-based hypervisors include:
• SafeG (Safe Gate), which presents an open-source solution to the dual-guest TrustZone-
assisted virtualization approach. SafeG supports a health monitoring mechanism, a secure
device sharing mechanism, and a cyclic and priority-based integrated scheduling policy
(Sangorrin et al., 2010).
• SASP or Secure Automotive Software Platform, developed by the Korea University in con-
junction with the Hyunday Motor Company, implements a dual-OS, RTOS and GPOS, con-
figuration with focus on secure device access, providing isolation between a control system
and an infotainment system in automotive vehicles (Kim et al., 2013).
• LTZVisor, a Lightweight TrustZone-assisted Hypervisor, is also an open-source dual-guest
solution, initially supporting the Armv7-A and recently extending to the Armv8-A and Armv8-
M architectures (Pinto et al., 2017b). LTZVisor also introduced the LTZVisor-AMP architec-
ture (Pinto et al., 2017a), which implements support for a supervised asymmetric multi-
processing configuration: one core runs in the secure world and hosts the secure software
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(LTZVisor and RTOS), while the other core runs in the normal world and hosts the non-
secure software (GPOS).
• VOSYSmonitor, developed by Virtual Open Systems, also implements a dual-OS virtu-
alization but, unlike the previous cases, was implemented with the Armv8-A architecture
as its target (Lucas et al., 2017). VOSYSmonitor leverages the virtualization extensions of
the Armv8-A, allowing the execution of a non-secure hypervisor separated from the secure
monitor layer where VOSYSmonitor runs.
More recently, researchers have tackled the main limitation behind TrustZone virtualization
mechanisms in regards to scalability (in terms of number of supported guests) which prevented
many authors from viewing TrustZone as a relevant virtualization solution (Pinto and Santos,
2019). Hypervisors like the RTZVisor (Pinto et al., 2016b) and its successor, the µRTZVisor
(Martins et al., 2017), present an architecture that allows execution of multiple guest OSes, i.e.,
more than two guests. As depicted in Figure 2.18, multi-guest approaches maintain the hypervisor
in monitor mode but delegate the execution of guests to the non-secure side, while the inactive
guests are kept in the secure world. This relies on the implementation of a dynamic TZASC-
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Figure 2.18: Multi-Guest Virtualization Typology
like controller so that only the active guest memory segment is kept in the non-secure side,
while inactive guests are safeguarded in secure segments. This guarantees the isolation among
guests, albeit with the caveat of requiring more cache and MMU maintenance operations at
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context switches, given that the non-secure MMU and cache interfaces are shared between the
guest partitions. Even so, this scalability issue remains prevalent given the variability of sectioning
granularity provided by the TZASC-like components, which limits the number and size of guests,
as further discussed in Section 4.
Given all these characteristics, it comes to no surprise that the dual-guest approach is the
most widely environment for TrustZone-assisted virtualization. It is also relevant to note that
solutions based on the TrustZone extensionsmainly target the Armv7-A architecture. This is mostly
due to the fact that there are still many industry platforms based on the Cortex-A9 processor
architecture, which does not implement Arm’s virtualization extensions, making TrustZone the
only hardware-assisted virtualization option on these hardware platforms.
2.4 Related Work
Although there are some existing words focused on TrustZone-assisted virtualization or on
the implementation of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) based on these extensions (Pinto
et al., 2017, Pinto and Santos, 2019), public studies focused on the intrinsics of the TrustZone
architecture are scarce. This limits the available knowledge of TrustZone’s potentialities and lim-
itations, which is detrimental to the development of solutions based on this technology, as well
restricting discussion to possible improvements and/or adaptations to the extensions that can
better fit the needs of system developers looking to implement TrustZone-based solutions. Even
so, a few recent works have helped uncover some of the vulnerabilities of this technology and a
couple of studies started painting a picture of the current TrustZone status and of what may be
its use for future applications.
In CacheKit (Zhang et al., 2016a), Zhang et al. demonstrated that the TrustZone address
tagging in cache lines can be a liability to the security of the system. This characteristic that
allows the same physical address to coexist in two different cache lines, which is very convenient
for performance, ends up breaking one of TrustZone’s fundamentals if not handled properly. With
CacheKit, Zhang shows that secure world cannot access cache lines tagged as non-secure, which
become invisible to a secure state processor, allowing nefarious code (such as a rootkit) to be
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hidden in the normal world cache, remaining undetected to conventional integrity system checking
mechanisms (Figure 2.19). Even so, as further discussed in section 5, this exploitation is only
viable when secure software has a memory view that does not reflect the true security state of
the different memory segments.
Figure 3. CacheKit Architecture
This is because some of the address ranges are mapped to
the bus for I/O devices instead of dynamic random access
memory (DRAM). A typical memory layout of a 32 bit
ARM system is shown in Figure 2. The address range from
0x0 to 0x7FFFFFFF is backed by I/O devices, and the range
from 0x80000000 to 0xFFFFFFFF is backed by system
memory.
This memory layout is used by the Memory Map Unit
(MMU) to route memory requests from the processor to ei-
ther DRAM or memory-mapped I/O (MMIO). Even though
the I/O space spans 2GB of address space, some of the area
is actually left unused. For example, on i.MX53, address
space from 0x1300000 to 0x1500000 is marked as unused
system reserved.
3. CacheKit Architecture
CacheKit is a stealthy cache-based rootkit that can evade
introspection from both the secure world and the normal
world on ARM TrustZone architecture. The overall architec-
ture of CacheKit is shown in Figure 3. The commodity rich
OS resides in the non-secure world, while the introspector
that performs the integrity checking runs in the secure world.
Both the rich OS and the introspector have their own
page tables, called non-secure system page table and secure
system page table, respectively, to translate virtual addresses
to physical addresses. Even if two virtual addresses are
different in two worlds, they may be translated into the
same physical address. Intuitively, the stored value at the
physical address should be same for both secure and non-
secure world; however, the cache entry may be different in
the two worlds even if the physical address points to the
same location in the RAM. CacheKit exploits this cache
incoherence design between the two worlds in TrustZone
to conceal malicious code and data from the introspector
running in the secure world. Since the malicious code
resides only in the cache of normal world, CacheKit can
escape from the detection of both the introspector and the
DMA-based memory forensics hardware, which can only
access the content in DRAM. This cache incoherence can be
maintained with hardware cache locks in ARM processors.
We can further improve the stealthiness of CacheKit by
mapping to unused I/O address space in order to defeat
detection by antivirus tools in the rich OS.
3.1. Cache Incoherence in TrustZone
All TrustZone enabled processors augment their cache
with an NS bit so that the cache controller is able to
distinguish if a cache line is a secure cache or a normal
cache [15]. Since the NS bit in cache tag is governed by
the security context of the processor, even though the secure
world can access the RAM of the normal world, it cannot
access the cache lines for the normal world. As shown in
Figure 4, cache contents at the same physical address can
be different for the two worlds. Therefore, if the malicious
code can be saved in the normal world’s cache, memory
forensic tools in the secure world would not be able detect
it.
Since no details have been provided in public documents
on how various settings affect the cache behavior between
the secure world and the normal world, we perform a
systematic study on cache behaviors in ARM TrustZone
and verify the identified cache incoherence problem on our
prototype platform. For example, through real experiments,
we observe that the effects of a cache flush depend on the
world in which it is performed. A cache flush in the secure
world will flush all the cache lines, regardless of the NS
bit of the cache line. However, when the cache flush is
performed in the normal world, it will only flush the normal
world cache, namely, the cache lines with NS = 1.
3.2. Cache Exploitation
To exploit this cache incoherence issue in TrustZone,
we need to tackle the challenges of loading the code only
into the normal world cache and maintaining an incoherent
state in the cache. First, we adopt the Cache-as-RAM (CAR)
Figure 2.19: CacheKit Architecture
Continuing the exploitation of this cache duality, in TruSpy (Zhang et al., 2016b) Zhang once
again proved that the separation between non-secure and secure cache lines in the same physical
cache block can be used as a security exploit in TrustZone-enabled platforms. In this work, a type
of cache-based attack called prime+probe is used by normal world software to extract an AES
key used by secure world to carry out encryption services. The authors rely on th fact that
even though non-secure lines cannot access secur ones, a non-secure cache fill can evi t a
secure line. This allows software running in normal world to track the cache utilization patters of
the secure world, which can enable malicious software in the normal world to retrieve sensitive
information stored in secure locations.
More recently, Benhani et al. (Benhani et al., 2017) analysed hybrid systems that combine
powerful processing systems with reprogrammable FPGA fabric and pointed some exploitable
weaknesses in the propagation of TrustZone between the two subsystems. Implementing small
changes to the programm ble log c, they were abl to, among other exploits, circumvent secure
access restrictions and create denial of service (DoS) attacks to e syst m by relying on the f t
that security propagation to the PL is solely based on the AWPROT/ARPROT AXI signals, which
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they could overwrite based on the target exploit. It is worth mentioning that these exploits would
require that an attacker has access to the register-transfer level (RTL) code of the victim platform.
In a different panorama, a couple of works have been recently published with the intent to
provide a holistic analysis of the TrustZone technology and its applications. These are mostly the
result of reviews to the existing TrustZone-related literature (Ngabonziza et al., 2016), aiming to
provide a context to the realm of everything TrustZone, hitting on architectural features and use
cases, in a comprehensive manner that does not delve deep into specification but still allows for
the identification of current flaws and future directions.
Very recently, Pinto and Santos published a highly comprehensive survey of the TrustZone
technology, conveniently named Demystifying Arm Trustzone: A Comprehensive Survey (Pinto
and Santos, 2019). This work presents a very thorough review of everything TrustZone, covering
the past, present and foreseeable future of TrustZone’s hardware and software, providing a very
detailed picture of this technology’s potentialities and vulnerabilities. This work starts by intro-
ducing the TrustZone architecture and its different facets in the application and microcontroller
processor profiles, also identifying the variety and market placement of TrustZone-enabled plat-
forms. Afterwards, the authors present the main characteristics that make TrustZone a viable
solution for the implementation of various Trusted Execution Environments and virtualization so-
lutions, always with the contextualization of current TrustZone-based solutions that are prevalent
in either the academic or industrial worlds. Finally, the main vulnerabilities and security issues
that have been identified by different authors are presented, before the authors reflect on the
future directions of the technology and of TrustZone research. As with TrustZone Explained, this
work was published with the intent of helping researchers and developers get familiarized with
and encourage further exploration of the TrustZone technology.
3. Platform and Tools
This chapter provides an overview of the hardware platforms and software environment used
in this evaluation. The evaluated TrustZone enabled platforms are briefly introduced, followed
by the software framework on which the conducted tests were based, with the relevant nuances
introduced in the version running in each platform. The TrustZone memory subsystem of the
selected boards is not covered at this point as it is detailed and discussed in the following chapter.
3.1 TrustZone-enabled platforms
As TrustZone starts playing a major role in securing IoT devices, given the hegemony of Arm
processors in this field, the number of TrustZone-enabled platforms is naturally increasing. In
a recent thorough TrustZone survey, Pinto and Santos (Pinto and Santos, 2019) pinpointed the
available range of TrustZone-enabled boards.
Regarding mid, high-end platforms (Cortex-A), the Xilinx platforms based on the Zynq-7000
SoC, or the more recent 64-bit UltraScale+, are usually the most attractive when starting to work
with TrustZone, given that Xilinx provides vast technical documentation on the subject. NXP is
another manufacturer whose reasonably-priced boards are well documented, being widely used
in academic projects (Guan et al., 2017, Yalew et al., 2017, Zhang et al., 2016a). At the lowest
price point in application devices, the RaspberryPi 3 has also been used in some projects (Liu
and Srivastava, 2017), despite not providing many TrustZone-related resources. Aiming at a more
industrial environment, companies like Nvidia and Renesas also present some platforms such as
the Jetson TX2 DevKit and the R-Car Starter Kit, but choose not to disclose the details of their
implementation.
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In the low-end devices’ sector, since the introduction of TrustZone to Cortex-M is relatively
new (late 2016), TrustZone-enabled platforms are scarce. Nuvoton has recently presented the
NuMicro M2351, based on the Cortex-M23 processor. Arm also came out with a development
board, the Musca-A1, based on the Cortex-M33, although not yet commercially available.
Given the availability of boards and support documentation, the selected boards for this work
were Xilinx’s ZYBO trainer board and the ZCU102 evaluation board, aswell as NXP’s MCIMX6DL-
SABRE and RaspberryPi’s RasperryPi 3B.
3.1.1 ZYBO Zynq-7000
The ZYBO (ZYnq BOard) is an entry level development platform manufactured by Xilinx, based
on the Zynq-7000 SoC family. As with all Zynq-7000 products, it incorporates a dual core 32-
bit Arm Cortex-A9 processor along with FPGA–based programmable logic in the same device
(Xilinx, 2016a). Given the flexibility provided by the FPGA, in conjunction with the diverse I/O
resources present in the different Zynq-7000 devices, this product range is suited for a wide set
of applications in distinct fields such as automotive, industrial, medical or video and security
equipment. As displayed in (Xilinx, 2016a, Figure 3.1), Xilinx’s design divides these Zynq-7000
devices into two main subsystems—the Processing System (PS) and the Programmable Logic
(PL)—on separate power domains.
The PS encloses memory and I/O interfaces, an Advanced Microcontroller Bus Architecture
(AMBA) interconnect that enables communication between all the PS components—and with the
PL—and the Application Processor Unit (APU). The latter contains the dual core Arm Cortex-A9
MPCore processor, a 32-bit multicore processor that implements the Armv7-A architecture, which
is the main control block of the system. Each of its cores has associated 32KB data and instruction
caches, that establish the first memory level (L1), and an MMU that enables virtual-to-physical
address translations. Below this first level of memory is the 512KB unified cache and then the
256KB of On-chip Memory (OCM), kept coherent by the Snoop Controller, which connects to the
Accelerator Coherency Port (ACP) for faster communication between processor and PL.
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The processor(s) in the PS always boot first, allowing a software centric approach for PL system boot 
and PL configuration. The PL can be configured as part of the boot process or configured at some 
point in the future. Additionally, the PL can be completely reconfigured or used with partial, dynamic 
reconfiguration (PR). PR allows configuration of a portion of the PL. This enables optional design 
changes such as updating coefficients or time-multiplexing of the PL resources by swapping in new 
algorithms as needed. This latter capability is analogous to the dynamic loading and unloading of 
software modules. The PL configuration data is referred to as a bitstream.
1.1.1 Block Diagram
Figure 1-1 illustrates the functional blocks of the Zynq-7000 AP SoC. The PS and the PL are on 
separate power domains, enabling the user of these devices to power down the PL for power 
management if required.
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Figure 1-1: Zynq-7000 AP SoC Overview
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Figure 3. : Zynq-700 SoC Block Diagram
The PL, derived from Xilinx’s FPGA technology, makes use of many types of resources such
as configurable logic blocks (CLBs) and DSP slices to implement hardware accelerators that boost
the systems’ functionality. The PL is configured either during the boot process or later on by the
PS, since the processors in the PS always boot first, allowing for a software-driven PL configura-
tion. The PS can even reconfigure the PL, through a process called partial reconfiguration (PR).
These options bring greater flexibility to the system, allowing for adjustments in the algorithms
implemented in FPGA fabric, as well as in power management since the PL can be shutdown
without affecting the PS.
In terms of connectivity, ZYBO provides various standard external interface peripherals—
USB2.0, SD/SDIO, UART, SPI, I2C, Ethernet—, general-purpose I/O (GPIO) in the form of push-
buttons, slide switches and leds, as well as media interfaces through audio input/output jacks and
HDMI or VGA ports. An external 512MB of DDR3 memory are connected to the board through the
dynamic memory controller, considerably expanding the board’s usability for larger applications
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where the small OCM would be lacking in terms of size.
As for security, besides allowing a secure boot process that loads authenticated and encripted
PS images and PL bitstreams, ZYBO relies on its TrustZone features to enable developers to
safeguard their systems. The secure boot process always initiates in a 128KB BootROM that isn’t
accessible to user applications and through a series of decryption operations determines if the
boot images are secure or not. After the system boots, security is managed trough a selection of
programmable TrustZone registers. All I/O devices mentioned in the previous paragraph can be
configured as secure or non-secure by the developer at runtime. Memory regions, as described
in the following chapter, can also be configured as secure or non-secure, but memory controllers
are always set as secure.
Given that LTZVisor was originally tailored for Zynq-7000 platforms, ZYBO is both the starting
point for this analysis and the chosen platform to test most of the MMU/cache scenarios, since
the most stable version of LTZVisor will be the one running on these platforms.
3.1.2 MCIMX6DL-SABRE
Based on NXP’s i.MX family of application processors, more specifically the i.MX6, the Smart
Application Blueprint for Rapid Engineering (SABRE) boards are targeted towards smart devices
that may require intelligent displays, connectivity and low power consumption. The i.MX pro-
cessors are NXP’s line of ”multimedia application processors”, optimized for the lowest power
consumption while delivering high-performance processing capabilities. These characteristics
make i.MX6 devices suitable for applications such as driver information systems, portable medic
devices and smart mobile devices with media-centric purposes (NXP, 2017).
SABRE platforms come equipped with either an i.MX 6Quad applications processor or an i.MX
6DualLite applications processor, based on the Arm Cortex-A9 MPCore—i.MX 6DualLite supports
a dual core Arm Cortex-A9 while i.MX 6Quad supports a quad core Arm Cortex-A9 configuration.
MCIMX6DL is a DualLite platform and, as such, implements a dual core Arm Cortex-A9 MPCore
configuration, similarly to the ZYBO board introduced previously. As with ZYBO, each CPU includes
a 32KB L1 instruction cache and a 32KB L1 Data cache, with a 512KB unified instruction and data
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cache shared between both cores. A top-level diagram of the i.MX6 DualLite SoC is presented in
(NXP, 2017, Figure 3.2), displaying themain subsystems present in the chip and their connectivity.
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Figure 1-2. Simplified block diagram
1.5.2 Architectural Partitioning
Architecture supports processing-intensive tasks in the following ways:
• ARM Cortex A9 MPCore™ Platform provides hardware features for:
• Operating System
• User applications (including control over hardware accelerators and non-
accelerated functions)
• TrustZone applications
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Figure 3.2: i.MX6 DualLite SoC Overview
Despite not possessing FPGA-fabric that allows for on-the-fly deployment of hardware mod-
ules, these boards come equipped wi h a pl thora of hardware acceler tors aimed at graphics
processing. These are a Video Processing Unit, 2D and 3D Graphics Processing Units (GPUs),
an Image Processing Unit, connected to various display pe ipherals, nd a Pixel Processing
Pipeline, which is r quired to support Electronic Paper Display (EPD) applications. Cementing
this multimedia-driven architecture, an Enhanced Serial Audio Interface, three I2S/SSI/AC97
interfaces and a Audio Multiplexer also provide a fast solution for processing and transmitting au-
dio. For more external general connectivity options, i.MX6 devices come equipped with three USB
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hosts, a Gigabit Ethernet Controller, five UARTs (Universal asynchronous receiver-transmitter) and
GPIO with interrupt capabilities.
Security is also enforced through a selection of hardware modules. The High Assurance
Boot (HAB) ensures the device boots safely, preventing the execution of unauthorized software
during the boot sequence and initializing the system accordingly. Masters’ access to peripherals is
regulated by the Central Security Unit (CSU). Distinguishing security attributes as Secure/Normal
and privilege as Supervisor/User, this unit allows developers to assign each peripheral to one
of the four possible types of accesses—Secure-Supervisor, Secure-User, Normal-Supervisor and
Normal-User. These configurations can be either be set and locked in the CSU registers during
the boot process or changed at runtime. As for securing memory, both the 256KB of OCM and
external 1GB of DRAM rely on TrustZone protection, through the OCM controller and a TZASC,
respectively.
This is the second of the evaluated platforms since it has the same Armv7-A 32-bit Cortex-A9
MPCore processing unit that ZYBO implements, which results in a more comparable version of
LTZVisor (unlike an Armv8-A 64-bit implementation), while implementing a different TrustZone
approach to the memory subsystem.
3.1.3 ZCU102 Evaluation Board
The Xilinx Zynq Ultrascale+ ZCU102 evaluation board is based on the Zynq Ultrascale+MPSoC
(multiprocessor system-on-chip) architecture, more specifically the EG device family of MPSoCs
(Xilinx, 2018). Building upon the APSoC architecture, that integrates software, hardware and I/O
programmability through its main subsystems, the PS and PL, the Ultrascale+ MPSoC architecture
represents Xilinxs’ response to the exponential growth in performance requirements, both in terms
of processing power and data transfer rates (Xilinx, 2014). These devices are designed to improve
current solutions in fields such as wireless communication that rely on more than one physical
platform, integrating them all into the same hardware device, allowing for faster processing with
lower power consumption.
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Processing System-wise, EG MPSoC devices are comprised of a quad-core Arm Cortex-A53
64-bit APU, a dual-core Arm Cortex-R5 32-bit real-time processing unit (RPU) and an Arm Mali-
400MP2 graphics processing unit (GPU). These three main subsystems in the PS side allow for
high performance multi-processing, enabling the deployment of complex real-time applications,
along with advanced graphics processing. To complement this approach, the PS is divided in
three encapsulated power domains (Xilinx, 2018, Figure 3.3)—the Battery Power Domain (BPD),
the Low Power Domain (LPD) and the Full Power Domain (FPD)— which can be configured and
controlled through the Platform Management Unit (PMU). The BPD is the lowest power domain
and it only comprises the Real-Time Clock and Battery-Backed RAM. The LPD, which contains the
RPU, a low-power DMA, the PMU and the Configuration Security Unit (CSU), along with Low-Speed
I/O and Static Memory Interfaces, is the second domain in the ascending power consumption
scale. The FPD is the highest power domain and has access to components such as the APU,
GPU, a full-power DMA, the Dynamic Memory Controller and High-Speed I/O, on-top of the LPD
and BPD components.
Similarly to the 32-bit dual-core Cortex-A9 processor present in the previous two boards, the
64-bit quad-core Arm Cortex-A53 also provides each of its cores their own 32KB L1 instruction
and data cache, with an additional 1MB of unified L2 cache shared among them. Based on
an Armv8-A processor, it is the only of the three main processing units with TrustZone support,
which could be a problem but, since both the Arm Cortex-R5 and the Arm Mali-400MP2 GPU
implement an AMBA3 AXI bus interface (ARM, 2011a, 2018a), they can directly be placed in
this TrustZone-enabled SoC design without additional logic—they will not drive the AXI AxPROT[1]
signal but maintain the value as it arrived to them, making it possible for propagation across the
entire system.
Following the increase of PS resources in Ultrascale devices, the PL also houses higher-
density and high-performance banks, almost tripling the amount of maximum logic cells when
compared to Zynq-7000 devices (Xilinx, 2016b), power-efficient transceivers and DSP blocks.
As with Zynq-7000 devices, the PS and the PL reside on separate power domains, making it
possible to power down the PL for power management purposes. The Ultrascale architecture also
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Chapter 3: Board Component Descriptions
The top-level block diagram is shown in Figure 3-1.
X-Ref Target - Figure 3-1
Figure 3-1: Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Top-Level Block Diagram
RPU
256 KB
OCM
LPD-DMA
CSU
PMU
Processing System
Cortex-R5
32 KB I/D
128 KB TCM
Cortex-R5
32 KB I/D
128 KB TCM
4 x 1GE
APU
Cortex-A53
32 KB I/D
Cortex-A53
32 KB I/D
Cortex-A53
32 KB I/D
Cortex-A53
32 KB I/D
GIC
SCU
ACP 1 MB L2
GPU
Mali-400 MP2
64 KB L2
2 x USB 3.0
NAND x8
ONFI 3.1
2 x SD3.0/
eMMC4.51
Quad-SPI
x 8
2 x SPI
2 x CAN
2 x I2C
2 x UART
GPIOs
SYSMON
M
IO Central
Switch
FPD-DMA
PCIe 
Gen4
DisplayPort 
v1.2 x1, x2
2 x SATA
v3.1
PCIe Gen2
x1, x2, or x4
SHA3
AES-GCM
RSA
Processor 
System BPU
DDRC (DDR4/3/3L, LPDDR3/4)
Programmable 
Logic
128 KB RAM
P
L_
LP
D
H
P
GIC
RGMII
ULPI PS
-G
TR
SMMU/CCI
GFC
USB 3.0
SGMII
Low Power Switch
To ACP
Low Power Full PowerBattery Power
32-bit/64-bit
64-bit
M S
128-bit
M S
LP
D
_P
L
H
P
C
H
P
M
GTY 
Quad
GTH 
Quad
Interlaken 100G Ethernet
A
C
E DisplayPort 
Video and 
Audio Interface
Lo
w
-la
te
nc
y
P
er
ip
he
ra
l P
or
t
Lo
w
-la
te
nc
y
P
er
ip
he
ra
l P
or
t
Send Feedback
Figure 3.3: Zynq Ultrascale+ MPSoC Block Diagram
introduces high-performance peripheral interfaces in the PL subsystem that allow for transmission
rates of hundreds of gigabits per second, such as 100G Ethernet or the Interlaken.
Regarding security, Ultrascale devices mainly implement two types of protection units to safe-
guard peripherals and memory: the Xilinx Peripheral Protection Unit (XPPU) and the Xilinx Mem-
ory Protection Unit (XMPU). Both these units are capable of enforcing security permissions (i.e.
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TrustZone secure/non-secure attributes) and masters’ privileges, denying transactions that do
not meet the security policy or from unauthorized masters.
Comparatively to the two previous boards, this architecture presents a much higher degree
of complexity, when viewed in an holistic panorama. To maintain the focus of this work, further
discussion of this platform will be approached from the view point of the APU, to establish common
ground with the evaluation of the previous two boards.
3.1.4 RaspberryPi 3B
RaspberryPi 3B, released in 2016, is the third-generation RaspberryPi board and the first
one to support the Armv8-A architecture. This single-board computer is a low cost platform
that is used worldwide by tech enthusiasts who seek a small but powerful device with media
connectivity options. Ranging from gaming consoles, surveillance systems, control stations for
climate systems, home router, digital picture frames and even pet feeders, it really is a versatile
system that can be the central processing hub for various applications.
The RaspberryPi 3B hosts a high-performance quad-core Arm Cortex-A53 cluster that is com-
plemented with 4GB of RAM, on-board Wi-fi, Bluetooth 4.2 and Ethernet, four USB ports, HDMI
and a 40-pin GPIO. Based on the Armv8-A architecture, this processing unit implements the Arm
security extensions, reason why this platform was a possible target of this study but, outside of
the processor domain, there is no further implementation of TrustZone extensions in the memory
subsystem. As such, the inclusion of RaspberyPi 3B in this work serves as the example of boards
which, although possessing a TrustZone-enabled processor, do not implement a system wide
separation between secure and normal worlds. Still, TrustZone applications that solely rely on
the extensions present in the APU (MMU/caches) can still be deployed in such devices or even
in a more educational context to familiarize a developer with the inner workings in developing
TrustZone-aware software.
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3.2 LTZVisor
LTZVisor is a Lightweight TrustZone-assisted Hypervisor that relies on the TrustZone hardware
extensions as means to implement a virtualized environment (Pinto et al., 2017b). Developed for
Armv7-A architecture—currently being ported to Armv8-A and Armv8-M—and supporting execution
in Zynq-7000 devices— support for Ultrascale+ and i.MX6 processors also currently deployed but
not publicly available—, it demonstrates how TrustZone can adequately be exploited as a virtual-
ization tool that meets real-time needs without hindering performance of hosted rich operating
systems.
3.2.1 Architectural Overview
By leveraging on the physical separation between secure and normal worlds in TrustZone
architecture, LTZVisor aims to implement three fundamental principles:
• The principle of minimal implementation: Minimizing the trusted computing base of the
system by offloading every possible feature to hardware, thus reducing the attack surface
for hackers trying to exploit code vulnerabilities.
• The principle of least privilege: Components must be given access only to strictly required
resources (e.g., I/O devices, system services, etc), promoting privileged execution and
hardware-enforced isolation of the real-time environment from the non-real-time one.
• The principle of asymmetric scheduling: Ensure that timing constraints are met, through
the implementation of an asymmetric scheduling policy, where the secure environment
has a higher privilege of execution than the non-secure one.
Complying with these guidelines, LTZVisor’s architecture is split into three main software com-
ponents: the hypervisor, the secure VM and the non-secure VM. Privileged software (hypervisor
and secure VM) runs in the secure world while the normal world hosts non-privileged software
(non-secure VM)— as presented in (Pinto et al., 2017b, Figure 3.4).
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Figure 3.4: LTZVisor Architecture
As LTZVisor may control/regulate access to every single component, it is logical that it runs
in the most privileged processor mode, monitor mode. This gives the hypervisor the power to
access all hardware or software resources, secure or non-secure, which it requires for setting
up the memory, interrupts and devices associated to each VM, as well as managing the Virtual
Machine Control Block (VMCB) at every context switch. Whenever the processor is about to run a
virtual machine, the hypervisor must restore that VM state to the physical processor context and,
likewise, save the current active VM state in the respective VMCB.
Also running in the secure world, but in a less privileged level—the supervisor mode—, the
secure VM needs to be aware of the virtualization environment it is placed in. This because while
running in the secure world, the VM has access to the non-secure memory or to memory-mapped
devices and, as such, can modify them. This fact makes the OS hosted on the secure VM part
of the system’s Trust Computing Base TCB, slightly increasing its footprint (Pinto et al., 2017b).
These make the secure VM ideal to run an RTOS, since the higher privilege of execution—as per
the principle of asymmetric scheduling—attributed to the secure world helps meeting its timing
requirements. Given that RTOSes usually have rather small memory footprints, it ends up being
a win-win situation for both the hypervisor and the RTOS.
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Lastly, the non-secure VM, also running in supervisor mode but in the normal world, is archi-
tecturally fit to accommodate a more general purpose guest OS. The isolation inherent to running
in the normal world means that there is no risk of interfering with another VM’s resources. If the
non-secure VM ever attempts to access secure memory or peripherals, an exception is immedi-
ately triggered to the hypervisor, which assumes control and deals with the situation accordingly.
3.2.2 Implementation Overview
To have an general comprehensive idea of how LTZVisor works, one mainly needs to under-
stand five concepts and how they are implemented: the concept of Virtual CPU in a TrustZone en-
vironment; the scheduling policy; how memory is partitioned and managed between both worlds;
partition of devices and management of interrupts.
3.2.2.1 Virtual CPU
As discussed in sections 2.2.1 and 2.3, TrustZone’s separation of worlds at processor level is
implemented through the use of banked registers that are assigned to each world, meaning that
the processor only sees the copy assigned to the current (security) state of execution. As such,
only the registers which are shared between normal and secure worlds need to be saved in each
VM’s control block (VMCB) for context switching purposes. These include the General Purpose
Registers (R0-R12) and the Stack Pointer (SP), Linker Register (LR) and Saved Program Status
Register (SPSR) of each execution mode.
With the purpose to reduce interrupt latency from the RTOS side when resuming execution,
there is an important design choice implemented in LTZVisor which differentiates the secure and
non-secure VMCBs: even though the non-secure VMCB contains all of the mentioned registers,
the secure VMCB solely saves the general purpose registers and one SP, LR and SPSR, allowing
for a faster context switch between VMs.
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3.2.2.2 Scheduling
LTZVisor’s scheduling policy guarantees that the non-secure guest OS is only scheduled during
the idle periods of the secure guest OS, and that the secure guest OS can preempt the execution
of the non-secure one. In fact, scheduling is controlled by the secure VM and not the LTZVisor
itself, which doesn’t take away LTZVisor’s execution privilege but configures it more as a passive
monitor which is responsible for dealing with context switches.
When the secure guest halts execution, it issues a Secure Monitor Call (SMC) to the hypervisor
signalling that the non-secure guest can now run until the secure timer tick interrupt configured
by the secure guest is triggered. This is possible because of the extra interrupt capabilities im-
plemented in a TrustZone-enabled platform as in the Interrupt Management section below.
3.2.2.3 Interrupt Management
The General Interrupt Controller (GIC) is extended in TrustZone-enabled SoCs to allow for
the configuration of secure and non-secure interrupts. Besides the GIC also allowing secure
interrupts to have higher priority than non-secure ones, LTZVisor still configures interrupts from
secure devices as FIQs and from non-secure devices as IRQs, to get the lowest latency possible
from the RTOS side.
When a secure interrupt is triggered while the RTOS is running, it is directly handled, without
the hypervisor intervening. When a secure interrupt is triggered while the non-secure GPOS is
running, execution is halted and redirected to the hypervisor, which will handle it. Non-secure
IRQs will always be handled by the non-secure guest whenever it is schedule to run, regardless
of which VM was running when the trigger happened.
3.2.2.4 Memory Partitioning
Since TrustZone-enabled platforms that do not support Arm’s virtualization extensions only
provide MMU support for single-level address translation, memory partitioning is guaranteed by
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a TZASC-like component. This ensures the normal world does not access secure memory. Un-
fortunately, as previously mentioned, the secure VM has to know the memory boundaries so that
it does not tamper with non-secure memory.
LTZVisor does not designate strict memory boundaries since different platforms have different
resources and constraints that may or may not allow for the same partitioning initially implemented
for the Zynq-700 devices. This is further discussed in the fourth chapter.
3.2.2.5 Device Partitioning
In a TrustZone environment devices can be configured as secure or non-secure, in a static or
dynamic configuration, depending on the SoC design. To ensure strong isolation between them,
LTZVisor does not allow guest partitions to share devices. As such, devices are assigned to each
partition at design time and configured in the boot process: devices used by the secure VM are
configured as secure while devices assigned to the non-secure VM are configured as non-secure.
3.2.3 Modifications to the LTZVisor
Besides the changes present in each ported version of the LTZVisor to the three different
boards, some modifications had to be carried out in order to evaluate the target architectures.
This section focuses not on the differences in the three LTZVisor versions that were deployed in
each board but on the necessary adaptations to run the proposed experiments. Thus, the main
modifications relate to the abort handling scheme, the enabling of MMU and caches and to the
creation of non-secure guests binary images.
3.2.3.1 Abort Handling
Since the errors detected by the TrustZone protection units trigger an abort exception in the
processor, it is necessary that these aborts do not totally halt system execution if the dynamic
run-time interactions are being evaluated. Given this situation, it was necessary to change the
existing basic abort handlers which stopped all execution, trapping it in a continuous loop. This
behaviour can be identified by looking at the monitor exception vector table (introduced in section
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2.2.1.4), since the default LTZVisor behaviour is to route aborts to monitor mode, whose exception
table is represented in the listing below, taken from the assembly implementation of the monitor
software.
Listing 3.1: LTZVisor Monitor Exception Vector Table
1 _monitor_vector_table:
2 b . @ Not available on MON
3 b . @ Not available on MON
4 ldr pc, __mon_smc_handler
5 ldr pc, __mon_prefetch_handler
6 ldr pc, __mon_abort_handler
7 b . @ Reserved for HYP
8 ldr pc, __mon_irq_handler @ Should never come here
9 ldr pc, __mon_fiq_handler
As pictured above, the original LTZVisor implementation prompts a jump to a defined address
each time an abort is received by the processor. This allows the usage of an external function
that can be defined in another file as the handler function, which in this case corresponds to a C
function that prints descriptive text and locks the execution in an endless cycle. This behaviour
could also be obtained with the jump instruction ”b .”, seen in listing 3.1 for the reserved/unavail-
able entries, that can also trap execution to the current address, but without providing information
of the origins of the abort. A more comprehensive external handler can be seen in listing 3.2,
where a set of external functions that read the values written to the data fault status registers
that provide information about the origin of the aborts. These values are useful from a debugging
point-of-view or in an implementation with a health monitoring service, where they are used by
the monitoring software to choose the appropriate measures to maintain system stability.
Listing 3.2: Example Abort Handler written in C
1 void mon_external_abt_handler(void){
2 printk("\t -> LTZVisor: External Data Abort Exception\n");
3 dfsr_dfar_interpreter(); //checks Data Fault Status Registers
for the origin of the abort
4 spsr_interpreter(); //verifies the Status Program Status
Register at the time of the abort
5 while(1);
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6 }
As one of the objectives of this thesis is to test the interactions of dynamically changing
the TrustZone protection parameters at run-time, stopping the execution every time an error is
triggered is not always the desired behaviour. As such, the intended approach was to disable
aborts from triggering an exception in the processor by masking them using the CPSR.A bit.
According to the Arm documentation, if this bit is set aborts are never taken until the bit is
cleared. Unfortunately, when testing this behaviour, it was only true when the MMU was enabled,
which would reduce the testable cases. The workaround to this policy was to route execution to
the instruction following the one that triggered the abort. To do so, the ldr instruction in line 6 on
listing 3.1 was changed to a SUBS instruction that returns to an instruction relative to the address
saved in the linker register when the exception was triggered. As introduced in section 2.2.1.2,
when a mode change is triggered (in this case, aborts are taken to monitor mode), the program
counter is stored in the LR register of the target mode, as well as the current program status
register and stack pointer, which the SUBS instruction also restores when returning to the original
mode. In the case of aborts, the saved address is two instructions beyond the one that triggered
the exception, which corresponds to two words, or eight bytes. So, the instruction placed in the
vector table is SUBS PC, LR, #4, which routes the execution to the instruction immediately after
the one that caused the abort.
3.2.3.2 Enabling Virtual Address Translation
The base version of LTZVisor runs with the MMU disabled to ensure a deterministic and real-
time execution environment. This restriction is imposed in the secure side, while non-secure
guests are free to enable and use a virtual memory translation regimen. When using the MMU
to perform address translations, it is essential that the devices’ memory layout described by the
page tables corresponds to the actual memory hardware limitations, in order to avoid system
failure. An example of how this could affect system behaviour would be to describe addresses
mapped to device access as cacheable addresses. As such, even though the process to create
the page tables can be the same for all boards, the layout will differ for all of them, since the
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address mappings of devices, ROM, OCM and DDR differ between the boards and so does the
mapping of guests for each LTZVisor version.
An approach that was followed to describe the memory layout implemented for the i.MX6
board can bee seen in the listings below, where each entry describes a 1MB section in a one-to-
onemapping, i.e., the initial and final addresses are the same, only differing in access permissions
or cacheability. These access parameters are set by bits 19-0, since matching a 1MB section only
needs the first twelve bits, and their encoding can be saved in macros to ease the implementation,
as represented in listing 3.3, where the fields such as IS_A_SECTION or S_NS are bit masks to the
corresponding positions in the descriptors for describing a 1MB section or a non-secure section
respectively.
Listing 3.3: Page Table Descriptors Assembly Macros
1 .set S_KERNEL1 , (S_AP1 |S_AP0 | IS_A_SECTION | S_TEX2 | S_TEX0 |
S_B) //write-back
2 .set S_KERNEL2 , (S_AP1 |S_AP0 | IS_A_SECTION | S_TEX2 | S_TEX1 |
S_C) //write-through
3 .set NS_KERNEL1 , (S_NS | S_AP1 |S_AP0 | IS_A_SECTION | S_TEX2 |
S_TEX0 | S_B)
4 .set NS_KERNEL2 , (S_NS | S_AP1 |S_AP0 | IS_A_SECTION | S_TEX2 |
S_TEX1 | S_C)
5 .set S_STRONGLY_ORDERED , (S_AP1 | S_AP0 | IS_A_SECTION)
6 ...
Then, since only the bits 31-20 are used to identify the section, a previously initialized counter
can be used to increment the addresses and ensure a one-to-one mapping by shifting its value
20 bits to the left. In the LTZvisor version deployed in this board, the secure guest can occupy
addresses between 0x1000_0000 and 0x3000_0000, part of the DRAM, while the non-secure
guest would populate addresses 0x3000_0000 and above, as represented on listing 3.4. In this
example, both the sections are defined as write-back cacheable. The non-cacheable sections
refer to addresses mapped to the ROM and peripherals, which in these case are both defined as
strongly ordered memory.
Listing 3.4: Page Table Definition for i.MX6 Board
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1 ...
2 .section .mmu_tbl ,"a"
3 .globl s_main_page_table
4 s_main_page_table:
5
6 .rept (0x9) //ROM & PERIPHERALS -> 0x0000_0000 to 0x0090_0000
7 .word (count << 20) | S_STRONGLY_ORDERED
8 .set count, (count + 1)
9 .endr
10
11 .set count, 0x9 //OCRAM -> 0x0090_0000 to 0x00A0_0000
12 .word (count << 20) | S_KERNEL2
13
14 .set count, 0xA //PERIPHERALS -> 0x00A0_0000 to 0x1000_0000
15 .rept (0xF6)
16 .word (count << 20) | S_STRONGLY_ORDERED
17 .set count, (count + 1)
18 .endr
19
20 .set count, 0x100 //S_DRAM -> 0x1000_0000 to 0x3000_0000
21 .rept (0x200)
22 .word (count << 20) | S_KERNEL2
23 .set count, (count + 1)
24 .endr
25
26 .set count, 0x300 //NS_DRAM -> 0x3000_0000 to 0x4000_0000
27 .rept (0x100)
28 .word (count << 20) | NS_KERNEL2
29 .set count, (count16 + 1)
30 .endr
31 ...
To enable the MMU, the address given by the s_main_page_table label must be used to initialize
the translation table base address (TTBR) before using the CP15 registers to activate the MMU
and the caches. If this value is not properly initialized, the software will not know where to search
for the address descriptors and will not be able to perform the translations.
3.2.3.3 Guest OSes
Given that the LTZVisor provides only the hypervisor and a modifiable secure guest imple-
mentation, a non-secure guest must be built externally and then imported by the LTZVisor at
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compile-time. To do so, LTZVisor expects a binary image to be placed on a defined location so
that the hypervisor knows where to route execution on a context switch. As for the secure guest,
it can be also be built externally or with the hypervisor.
In order to avoid conflicts with the LTZVisor implementation of utilities, the guests were de-
ployed using the same libraries and toolchains as the hypervisor and, given that the purpose of
this thesis is to test the interactions between the guests in both worlds, these were kept as rather
simple bare-metal implementations that allow for a clearer debugging process. Adding a RTOS
or a GPOS would not be advantageous, given that the properties being evaluated do not rest on
the complexity of the guests but rather on the architectural choices of the TrustZone and the SoC
implementations.
As such, for each behaviour that was being tested there were adaptations to the secure and
non-secure guest implementations but, in an holistic view, the guests can be reduced to software
issuing secure and non-secure memory accesses to pre-defined locations. Thus, by combining
different configurations, such as enabling cache on only one world at a time or using different
page descriptors in each guest, the implications of the evaluated properties could be compared
and evaluated.
4. TrustZone Memory Subsystem: Main
Memory
This chapter focuses on the implementation of TrustZone extensions in the main memory
subsystem, below cache level. The TrustZone-enabled IP developed by Arm to secure these
larger memory blocks is reviewed, according to the documentation provided by Arm, before three
different implementations in TrustZone-aware platforms are presented and compared.
4.1 TrustZone-enabled IP
The perception of TrustZone’s security state relies on the introduction of a 33rd address bit
that can be propagated all throughout the system. This is accomplished by turning the AXI bus
fabric that connects the various system components into a TrustZone-aware interface. That is the
purpose of the AWPROT[1] and ARPROT[1] signals, for write and read transactions respectively—
a low-driven signal means a transaction is secure while a high matches to a non-secure access.
As such, the implementation of TrustZone-enabled IP depends on its ability to identify the state
of the AxPROT[1] signals, which effectively means it must at least possess a slave AXI interface.
The two main TrustZone-enabled IP blocks that Arm provides for securing memory, the Trust-
Zone Memory Adapter (TZMA) and the TrustZone Address Space Controller (TZASC), function in
a region-based approach, allowing the partitioning of memory into secure and non-secure seg-
ments, but with very different characteristics in terms of number of regions, granularity and
configurability. Both of these controllers receive external signals to configure the region security
partitioning, which is then enforced through comparison between the configured address ranges
and the issued address.
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The TrustZone Memory Adapter was developed with the purpose of allowing a flexible partition-
ing of on-chip memory into a secure and a non-secure region, in order to diminish the constraints
that partitioning made at SoC design time presents to the deployment of system software (ARM,
2006). The TZMA allows a memory block of up to 2MB to be sectioned into two different regions—
a lower secure region and a higher non-secure region—, according to the secure region size value
given by the R0SIZE input, with a minimum size and at incremental steps of 4KB (Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1: TrustZone Memory Adapter
As evident, even though the TZMA is useful in some specific situations, this device is not
suitable for larger and more flexible applications, reason why Arm introduced the TrustZone Ad-
dress Space Controller. The TZASC follows the same principle of the TZMA, meaning that it can
dynamically receive a set of configuration parameters to enforce specific AXI access policies, but
is fit for a larger and more flexible usage. Whereas the TZMA could only divide a memory block of
up to 2MB into two regions, the TZASC supports a variable maximum address range (that should
be set accordingly with the system bus width) and a configurable number of regions, where each
region is programmable in terms of size, base address, priority and security parameters. Pro-
viding up to sixteen overlappable (priority-based) regions with a minimum size of 32KB, that can
each be divided into eight subregions, the TZASC can enforce security policies in fine-grained
4KB steps (ARM, 2008). Figure 4.2 illustrates an example TZASC configuration where we can
see that region 0 covers the entire address range as the lower priority region. This region cannot
be disabled and has no subregions, presenting a fallback to the system, in case all the other
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Figure 4.2: TrustZone Address Space Controller Regions
regions are disabled. All other regions are configurable in terms of size and subregion disabling
in addition to the security permissions. Besides these improvements, the TZASC also introduces
a ”Security Inversion” operation mode, which can be very useful in terms of system determinism
and isolation. When running with security inversion enabled, in addiction to rejecting non-secure
access from accessing secure locations, the TZASC also rejects secure accesses from changing
or retrieving non-secure memory locations. This effectively enforces secure world software to
issue its transactions according to the security state of memory being accessed, eliminating the
possibility of an address coexisting in two different states, which can be exploitable as referenced
in section 2.4 when CacheKit (Zhang et al., 2016a) was discussed.
In both of the presented IP blocks, the configuration parameters come from non-AXI signals,
which means that they have no control over the validity and security of the permissions they
enforce. To ensure this validity, these signal sources must be placed in a trusted location at
SoC design time, that will only be accessible by secure world software. For this purpose, Arm
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introduced the TrustZone Protection Controller (TZPC), a device that has control over the security
state of peripherals connected to the AXI-to-APB bridge, such as the TZASC which receives its
configurations signals through an APB interface, and that can also drive the R0SIZE parameter. To
enforce this root of trust, the AXI-to-APB bridge must be hard coded to only route secure accesses
to the TZPC. If the protection controller is guaranteed to only be accessible by secure software, it
can then dynamically inform the AXI-to-APB bridge of which peripherals are to be secure-access
only or available for normal accesses so that it can route or reject the AXI transactions to those
devices. Its important to note that although this is the approach Arm recommends to the securing
of the memory subsystem, these choices are still implementation defined, meaning that any
manufacturer can choose to implement their own version of protection devices or architectural
design, as discussed in the section below.
4.2 SoC Implementations
As previously introduced, Arm does not force manufactures to abide to a single approach
or to even use their own system IPs when implementing TrustZone-enabled SoCs. As a result,
different manufacturers, or even different boards from the same manufacturer, present a varied
set of features and constraints that may be crucial to the development of system software.
This section reviews three implementations of TrustZone-enabled memory subsystems in
three different SoCs, through the boards introduced in Section 3. Their memory subsystems are
analysed in terms of granularity, access permissions and dynamism of the configurable protec-
tions to the on-board and external memory.
4.2.1 Zynq-7000
The first of the evaluated boards, the ZYBO Zynq-7000 board, manufactured by Xilinx, presents
a totally custom implementation to the TrustZone memory subsystem. All Zynq-7000 devices
come equipped with a dedicated memory mapped TrustZone module which is used to configure
the security permissions of all system components. Xilinx does not disclose many details of how
Chapter 4. TrustZone Memory Subsystem: Main Memory 63
this controller is implemented, only providing information about how to use the controller, with a
set of programmable registers that are used to configure the security permissions.
In terms of on-chip memory (OCM), Zynq-7000 devices support TrustZone regions with a
granularity of 4KB. In the ZYBO, the full 256KB of on-chip RAM are sectioned into sixty-four pages
which can be configured as secure or non-secure. To do so, the TrustZone module provides two
32-bit registers, TZ_OCM_RAM0 and TZ_OCM_RAM1, where each bit describes the security state
of an incremental 4KB page—a value of one identifies a non-secure page while a value of zero
signals that that 4KB range can only be accessed by a secure transaction.
As for securing DRAM which is externally connected to the board, although the configuration is
also made through the TrustZone module, the supported granularity drops to 64MB sized pages.
The register control over DRAM security is similar to the OCM implementation, where each bit
of the 32-bit TZ_DDR_RAM register can be set to identify a non-secure 64MB slot or cleaned
to signal a secure 64MB region. Since the ZYBO solely possesses 512MB of DRAM, only the
least significant eight bits of these register are used to set the permissions to the eight possible
64MB regions. Figure 4.3 displays the overall TrustZone configuration architecture implemented
in ZYBO, where we can see the contrast between the support for fine-grained OCM and the
coarser-grained TrustZone sectioning of external DRAM.
By clumping the TrustZone system configurations into a set of memory mapped registers
under the same module, Zynq-7000 devices simplify, by design, the job of a system programmer.
Firstly, since the configuration is set solely through the mapped registers and not with the help of
a dedicated protection device, a programmer has no responsibility in terms of initialization, which
is required when working with standalone controllers. Furthermore, as they only allow these
registers to be accessed by secure software, and which can additionally be locked to prevent any
software from changing the registers until the next power-on-reset cycle, there are no concerns
regarding nefarious software tampering the memory security permissions.
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Figure 4.3: ZYBO TrustZone Support for OCM and DDR
4.2.2 i.MX6
Out of the three evaluated boards, the MCIMX6DL-SABRE board, based on the i.MX6 SoC,
is the only one that openly uses some of Arm’s TrustZone system IP to secure the memory
subsystem. In a different approach to the previous implementation in Zynq-7000 devices, that
choose to keep all configurations under a single set of memory mapped registers, i.MX6 devices
delegate the TrustZone configurations to dedicated controllers that dictate the system’s access
policies.
Despite not specifying the on-chip memory protection as being handled by a TrustZone Mem-
ory Adapter, the approach to securing OCM in these devices is very similar to that of a TZMA.
Akin to the TZMA, the OCM controller provides a sizing parameter (with a 4KB granularity) that
identifies a secure region within the on-chip memory block but, contrary to the TZMA approach
Chapter 4. TrustZone Memory Subsystem: Main Memory 65
where the secure region starts on the first address and has a variable size, this implementation
provides an input that identifies the starting address of a secure region (OCRAM_TZ_ADDR), ex-
tending to the end of the 256KB block (Figure 4.4). This effectively means that while the TZMA
separates a block into a low secure region and a high non-secure region, i.MX6 devices support
a low non-secure region and a high secure region. The on-chip memory controller also allows the
deactivation of this security check through an enable input (OCRAM_TZ_EN) and the locking of
both the secure starting address and the enable status until the next power-on reset cycle. These
inputs are driven by a set of registers (e.g. IOMUXC_GPR10) under the control of a separate
controller, meaning that securing accesses to the TrustZone security configurations of on-chip
memory relies on more than the OCM controller, as discussed further below.
Protecting the external DRAM, a TrustZone Address Space Controller instance is connected
to each of the two multi mode DDR controllers present in the board (Figure 4.5). These two
memory interfaces (MMDC0 and MMDC1) can be used for implementing different memory map-
ping modes, such as interleaved schemes where the address space is split between two external
memory blocks connected to each controller. The two TZASC instances work independently and
must each be configured according to the memory mapping mode being employed, meaning that
the addresses set in the TZASC configurations must match the ones being issued to the specific
controller. As with the on-chip memory approach, the TZASC configurations can also be locked
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Figure 4.4: i.MX6 OCM TrustZone Support
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until the next power on cycle through the respective input and, since this is a dedicated controller,
there is also the need to properly configure the clock routing and settings to the TZASC, contrary
to the implementations previously presented.
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Figure 4.5: i.MX6 DDR TrustZone Support
As introduced in section 3.1.2, i.MX6 devices possess a Central Security Unit (CSU), only
accessible by secure software, that dictates the access policies applied to masters accessing
system peripherals. This unit acts like a TrustZone Protection Controller and, coupled with a
peripheral bridge—alike the configuration previously displayed in Figure 2.14—, sets the security
permissions of all devices, including the TZASC and OCM security configurations. This means
that, contrary to the approach in the Zynq-7000 devices where modifying TrustZone configurations
could only be done by secure software, ensuring that these configurations cannot be modified by
untrusted software requires an extra step of identifying and protecting the registers which drive
the security input signals to these controllers.
4.2.3 UltraScale+
The third of the surveyed hardware platforms, the ZCU102 evaluation board based on the
Xilinx Zynq Ultrascale+ MPSoC architecture, follows an approach to the TrustZone memory sub-
system that can be seen as a middle ground between the two previous implementations. This
implementation uses dedicated custom controllers to protect system resources from accesses
made by specific masters, taking into account their current TrustZone security state. Ultrascale+
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devices split the protection of system resources between two types of units, the Xilinx Memory
Protection Units (XMPUs) and Peripheral Protection Units (XPPUs), with the memory subsystem
protection being under the control of the former.
Xilinx’s Memory Protection Units implement a set of region-based memory security mech-
anisms, including validating the ID of the master accessing memory along with the TrustZone
security state of the transaction. Similarly to the TrustZone Address Space Controller, XMPUs
can distinguish between sixteen overlappable regions in an address range, configurable as se-
cure or non-secure, following the same priority based scheme of the TZASC. As with the TZASC,
these regions can be independently disabled and, akin to the security inversion mode, each region
can also prevent secure software from accessing non-secure memory with a secure transaction.
Apart from the TrustZone sectioning, each region can also be configured to reject both read or
write transactions, regardless of the security state associated with the memory access. Contrary
to the TZASC approach, in which a region starting address was specified along with a sizing pa-
rameter (minimum 32KB), XMPU region boundaries are set with a starting and an end address,
which are restricted by an alignment parameter that may vary according to the characteristics of
the protected memory block.
Ultrascale+ boards possess a total of eight XMPU instances protecting the memory subsys-
tem. Six of these are connected to the six available DDR ports (route traffic from masters in
the different power domains and programmable logic), while the two other protect the on-chip
memory and a set of memory mapped components (Figure 4.6). From the APU viewpoint, three
of these instances are used: one for securing the OCM and one securing each of the two the
parallel AXI channels connected to the DDR ports. These respectively implement an alignment of
4KB and 1MB, which effectively means that the lowest possible region size is of 4KB for on-chip
memory and 1MB for external DDR.
As with the Zynq-7000 implementation previously presented, changing the TrustZone config-
urations can only be done by secure software despite this more modular approach more in tune
with the i.MX6 architecture, which results in a similar level of flexibility but that much more secure
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Figure 4.6: XMPUs in the Ultrascale+ Architecture
to implement. Furthermore, a system programmer does not have the concern of clock initializa-
tion and routing, programming these units by solely writing to the mapped XMPU registers.
4.3 Discussion
With the review of these three implementations, along with the knowledge that not every
TrustZone-enabled platform implements a TrustZone-aware memory subsystem (such as in the
RaspberryPi 3B case), the implementation-defined facet of this technology and its inherent port-
ing concerns become more clear. Apart from the different configuration steps required by the
various controllers, whose impact can be mitigated by implementing drivers that abstract and
standardize the configuration process, the main issues may arise with the disparity in terms of
supported granularity, access permissions and dynamism of the target regions. Table 4.1 sum-
marizes the three reviewed implementations by identifying the minimum region size that can be
protected for DDR and OCM memory, whether a security inversion mode (only allowing NS ac-
cesses to NS memory) can be enabled for regions defined in either of the two memory blocks,
if the configurations can be changed by a non-secure access and if the region configurations are
modifiable at run time, for each of the evaluated SoCs.
These features were selected as the comparing point between implementations not only be-
cause they are the ones which are common to almost all implementations, and whose parame-
ters more clearly vary between them, but also for being the characteristics that present biggest
constraints to the development of solutions based on the technology. The following subsections
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Table 4.1: SoC Implementations Summary
SoC Zynq-7000 i.MX6 Ultrascale+
DDR Granularity 64MB 4KB 1MB
OCM Granularity 4KB 4KB 4KB
Security Inversion None DDR OCM and DDR
Access Permissions Secure-only Secure and Non-secure Secure-only
Dynamic Config Yes (a) Yes Yes
(a) only the region security profile is dynamic
describe why and how these different properties can influence the creation, porting and execution
of system software to a TrustZone-enabled platform.
4.3.1 Granularity
The granularity of securable regions is one of the parameters that may more obviously present
an obstacle to the development of system software and to its porting between different boards.
From the TrustZone-assisted virtualization point-of-view we take in this thesis, the biggest impact
this attribute imposes is set on the number of possible virtual machines and in the memory
fragmentation that the isolation between them creates. The larger the granule size, the less
regions can be independently programmed, which in consequence means less VMs can be im-
plemented, relevant in the multi-guest implementations but not so much in classical single/dual-
guest approaches. As for the memory fragmentation facet, the larger granule sizes affect all
implementations, since having bigger regions simply lowers the percentage of memory usage
when compared to regions that more closely match the guest OS sizes. For example, if deploying
VMs in a Zynq-7000 device, where the DDR granularity is 64MB, the two worst case scenarios
would be implementing a 65MB guest or a 1MB one. In the first case, one guest would be occu-
pying two separate regions, with one of them having 63MB of unallocated memory, which would
also happen in the case of a guest size of 1MB.
Another aspect to consider in regards to granularity is the flexibility of region size and start-
ing address. Out of the three reviewed implementations, only the Zynq-7000 had static region
placement, where the regions are pre-defined and can only be configured as secure or non-
secure—strictly speaking, region 0 of a TZASC also cannot be displaced, but this is a special case
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that covers the whole address space as a safeguard. The two other implementations allowed
for the overlap of regions and with a flexible address mapping, diminishing the fragmentation
problems as in the case mentioned in the previous paragraph. Implementations that allow for
a flexible mapping of regions also facilitate the introduction of functionalities to the system, as
in the case of Inter-VM communication, which many times even resorts to the usage of shared
memory between the guest partitions, besides enabling memory mappings that are well suited
to the guest sizes.
4.3.2 Dynamic Configurations
Static versus dynamic configuration regimes always pivot around the same argument: static
approaches provide a deterministic aspect that is usually associated with a more secure and
higher performance implementation, usually at the cost of functionality, while dynamic systems
provide the flexibility necessary to implement more complex solutions but must be more carefully
handled so that performance and security metrics are not undermined. This is particularly rele-
vant in the embedded systems realm, where the growing complexity of solutions must still abide
to strict timing and security metrics and performance is not measured just in terms of speed of
execution.
In the context of this thesis, the dynamism is evaluated in terms of the possible region configu-
rations of security parameters. Every implementation reviewed supports a dynamic configuration
of most region properties, with the exception of the Zynq-7000 case, where a programmer can
only set the security state of pre-defined regions. The security state of a region is the most im-
portant of these properties to be able to dynamically change and is essential when implementing
a multi-guest TrustZone-assisted virtualization approach. Changing other properties such as re-
gion size and starting addresses at runtime is not as crucial but may still prove to be useful
when implementing more complex solutions that rely on flexibility, as in the case of communica-
tion procedures between specific VMs. Even so, all the reviewed implementations also provide
mechanisms to lock the configurations until the next power-on reset cycle, thus allowing for a
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more deterministic implementation in systems that must meet tighter security and performance
metrics.
This dynamism does impose some obstacles in terms of coherence that may affect deter-
minism and overall security, mainly when employing a virtual memory architecture that keeps
memory locations stored in caches. This is further detailed in chapter 5.2 but its drawbacks can
also be observed in a full bare-metal approach where the issued addresses are not translated into
their final addresses. Allowing changes to the security properties at runtime may compromise
isolation among VMs or even their execution, which could happen if software changed the entire
address range to non-secure memory or to secure memory, respectively. As such, it is important
that access to configuration registers is made by a trusted source.
4.3.3 Security Inversion
The security inversion characteristic refers to the capability some controllers have of denying
transactions marked as secure from accessing memory located in a non-secure region. This
does not mean that the secure-world cannot access non-secure memory—as that would be a
violation of the TrustZone specifications— but rather that it must issue non-secure transactions
when accessing non-secure memory. Out of the three reviewed architectures, only the Ultrascale+
architecture provides this mode to both memory blocks, while the i.MX6 devices allow its usage
in protecting the DDR and the Zynq-7000 memory subsystem does not implement such feature
in its TrustZone security controller.
This feature may seem useless when in a pure bare-metal environment that does not imple-
ment a virtual memory approach with cache support, where a physical address cannot exist in
two different states which, as previously mentioned, is not true when working with caches. This is
further explored in chapter 5, where this property is described to provide a safeguard to possible
misconfiguration of the virtual memory mapping between the guests and the hypervisor that can
result in inconsistencies around the current true state of a memory address location. In an ap-
proach that does not use virtual memory, this property is useful in ensuring isolation between the
secure and non-secure VMs. Even though the hypervisor must be considered a trusted source
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of execution, the behaviour of secure VMs should not be taken as guaranteed to not tamper with
other system resources. In an ideal implementation, secure software would always be trusted,
but the increasing use of open-source software and third party services to implement some gen-
eral features adds an unknown factor that should be accounted for. By using this feature in a
bare-metal implementation, since a secure-VM can only issue secure accesses, it would not be
able to access memory tagged as non-secure, thus ensuring a secure VM would not compromise
non-secure VM execution.
4.3.4 Access Permissions
Out of the attributes referred in this section, the access permissions (allowing non-secure
software to change TrustZone configurations), seem to be the least useful and most dangerous.
While the more coarse granularity options may diminish the efficiency of the system, the lack
of dynamism reduce its functionality and given that the security inversion serves a purpose of
increasing determinism, the access permissions have no visible benefit. Allowing non-secure
software to meddle with the security configurations cannot be seen as good policy, reason why
both the Xilinx platforms do not authorize it but, as evaluated, is possible in the i.MX6 implemen-
tation.
Since many of these controllers have APB interfaces for its configuration registers, which
do not distinguish secure and not secure accesses, securing access to their configuration must
be done on the AXI-to-APB bridge, either statically or through a TZPC-like controller, as previously
explained. Leaving this parameter as a writeable register, for a device that is responsible for setting
security configurations, shifts the responsibility of setting the configuration access as secure-only
to the system programmer, which only adds a point of attack to the system with no foreseeable
benefits.
5. TrustZoneMemory Subsystem: MMU/-
Caches
This chapter focuses on the changes introduced to the virtual memory and cache models
in Arm processors by the TrustZone extensions. The modifications to the architecture are intro-
duced and then reviewed, to better understand how they may influence software development
and execution.
5.1 Two Address Spaces
As previously presented, TrustZone-enabled processors add a security bit to every issued
address, allowing for the distinction between two address spaces: a secure and a non-secure
one. In an implementation that does not enforce a virtual memory translation regime, where all
issued addresses match the final target physical address, this bit is solely used by the TrustZone IP
presented in the previous chapter to block non-secure software from accessing memory marked
as secure. However, when implementing a solution that supports a virtual memory architecture,
this bit can be used by secure software to issue non-secure memory accesses, effectively acting
as non-secure software. The relevancy of allowing secure software to make non-secure accesses
is tied to how TrustZone is extended to the cache memory level, as explained further ahead.
To distinguish between the two address spaces, changes were made to the translation process
carried out by the MMU that turns a virtual address issued by the processor into a real physical
memory address. As such, the table entries that describe how a virtual addressmust be translated
to its target physical address were extended with a non-secure bit that identifies whether the final
address will be issued as secure or non-secure, in the case of an address issued by secure
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software. When a transaction is requested by non-secure software, this bit is irrelevant for the
translation process, since non-secure software can only issue accesses tagged as non-secure.
This behaviour is pictured in Figure 5.1, where two possible page table entries for each translation
are displayed, one describing a secure page and another describing a non-secure one.
ARM Processor
Secure
Page Table Entry, NS=0 Page Table Entry, NS=1
Virtual Address
Physical Address [0] Physical Address [1]
ARM Processor
Non-Secure
Page Table Entry, NS=0 Page Table Entry, NS=1
Virtual Address
Physical Address [1] Physical Address [1]
Figure 5.1: TrustZone-aware Address Translation Process
This change in the translation process is also reflected in the Translation Lookaside Buffer
(TLB) entries that store recent translations performed by the MMU. With the TrustZone extensions,
these units now store the security state of the processor that requested a particular translation,
alongside the issued virtual address and its corresponding physical address (extended with the
NS bit), as displayed in Figure 5.2. The addition of the world which requested each translation
enables TLB maintenance operations that can target specific entries from one of the two worlds.
In effect, this reduces the performance drop their execution would pose to the other world, such
as when invalidating entries, but also implies more steps when targeting both address spaces, as
they need to be executed in both worlds.
TrustZone literature refers to this field as the NSTID (Non-secure Table Identifier), since it tells
the TLB which of the translation tables (secure or non-secure copy of the TTBR) was accessed
by the processor when performing the translation. This does pose a question on how it can
be manipulated and, given the lack of detailed information, it could create some confusion. At
first sight, one could assume that this field reflects the state of the SCR.NS bit that dictates
the security state of every mode except for monitor mode. If this was the case, since monitor
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Figure 5.2: TrustZone-aware TLB
mode can technically run with either SCR.NS bit value, it should be able to manipulate this field to
operate over either address space, which would ease maintenance targeting both address spaces.
This hypothesis was tested by invalidating the TLB at specific points of execution after changing
the LTZVisor guest translation tables at run-time and seeing which entries were invalidated, with
the results summarized in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: TLB Maintenance Operations From Different Sources
Invalidates TLB Entries
Execution State NS Page Table S Page Table
Guest NS Yes No
Guest S No Yes
Monitor S No Yes
Monitor NS No Yes
The results presented above, coupled with also observing that monitor mode always uses the
secure copy of the TTBR when translating an address, regardless of the SCR.NS bit status, lead to
the conclusion that monitor mode always executes as secure software, even though it has access
to the non-secure copies of the banked registers. As such, even though monitor mode can still
be used to configure the virtual machine environments prior to their execution, an hypervisor will
have to leave monitor mode and switch between security states when performing maintenance
operations targeting both address spaces.
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5.2 TrustZone-aware Caches
After a translation is performed by the MMU and a final physical address is issued to the
memory subsystem, tagged with the corresponding NS bit, it is important to take into account
the changes introduced to the cache level, before reaching the main memory. Even though there
are some differences between the implementations of level-1 and optional lower level caches, the
main modifications are true to all levels and reflect the changes to the address spaces, while the
divergences mostly affect the cache maintenance operations.
The architecture of TrustZone-enabled caches is rather simple to understand if we view the
same unique physical address as two distinct physical addresses when tagged with different NS
fields. In doing so, cache lines will be filled as depicted in Figure 5.3 after receiving a physical
address resultant of the translation process. In the figure, the connection between the main
memory block and the bus interface is present to represent the implementations that may not
include a level-2 cache controller and, as such, would not receive transactions from that source.
In any case, these connection points are where a TZASC-like controller would be placed and thus
the final destination for TrustZone-aware addresses.
L1 Cache
Physical Address [NS]
NSPA
NSPA
Line Data
Line Data
AXI Bus Interface
L2 Cache
NSPA
NSPA
Line Data
Line Data
Main Memory Block
Line Data
Line Data
PA
PA
Figure 5.3: TrustZone-aware Caches
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According to Arm, adding the feature of allowing the same physical address location to be
stored in two different lines, when tagged with different NS bits, was done to increase system
performance. If both worlds wished to use caches but these were not extended with the NS
tag, there would be a need to flush its contents every time a world switch occurred, in order
to guarantee that non-secure software would not access secure information. By tagging every
address with the security context of the associated transaction, this need to flush the cache
when switching worlds is removed by guaranteeing that non-secure software can only access
lines tagged as non-secure, which consequentially increases the system performance. Arm also
mentions the increased performance of communication mechanisms between both worlds, which
most likely refers to the possibility of both worlds accessing the same non-secure lines (if secure
world issues non-secure accesses to a specific region), but this would also be the case if caches
were not extended with the NS tag.
Unfortunately, this design choice may present some drawbacks in terms of determinism and
security, which are further amplified by the lack of information on how these features are im-
plemented (mainly in L1 caches) since these are hardware implementations to which system
software is oblivious. Moreover, this choice of allowing the same address to be described in two
different lines drifts away from previous Arm architectural choices at cache level, specifically in
the implementation of the write-back and write-through attributes. The implemented policy dic-
tated that it was illegal to map a physical page with multiple cacheability attributes—this would
happen when one page table described the address range as write-back and another one as write-
though—in order too prevent unpredictable behaviour in the system. As such, no page described
as write-through is allocated in the cache but rather directly sent to the AXI master interface. Even
so, as detailed below, this mismatch of attributes becomes a concern with the introduction of the
TrustZone extensions, as the NS field effectively acts a cacheability attribute that can differently
describe a single physical address.
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5.2.1 Eviction Policy
One of the first features to raise some concerns in the academic community was the eviction
policy of TrustZone-aware caches. As described in official TrustZone documentation, any non-
locked down cache line can be evicted to make space for new data, regardless of its security
state, which means that it is possible for a secure line load to evict a non-secure line, and for a
non-secure line load to evict a secure line. This reflects a choice of not granting a performance
privilege to any of the two worlds, which is comprehensible given the fact that preventing non-
secure line fills from evicting secure lines could severely impact the non-secure execution, but
may present an increase in the vulnerability to cache-based attacks.
As identified in several academic works (Guanciale et al., 2016, Lipp et al., 2016, Zhang et al.,
2016b), this eviction policy potentiates cache-based attacks that, through prime-and-probe and
timing analysis techniques, are able to retrieve sensitive encrypted information from the secure
world. Since two lines describing the same address, one as secure and one as non-secure, can
be found in the same set of cache locations, software running in the normal world can monitor
the cache movements of the secure world and later compromise the confidentiality or integrity
of secure operations. Figure 5.4 illustrates the basic layout of a prime-and-probe attack that can
be used to track secure information such as execution/memory access patterns, by monitoring
the cache content modifications after secure software runs, in a simple direct mapped cache
implementation.
These mismatched attributes can also be exploited from a memory evasion standpoint, where
nefarious software is invisible to memory introspection software, as in the CacheKit (Zhang et al.,
2016a) example. Relying on the fact that the cache contents of a secure and a non-secure line
that are mapped to the same physical address can differ, malicious software can in theory evade
checks from the secure world. This banks on assuming that the secure monitoring software only
issues secure accesses to memory and, as such, has no view of the non-secure lines, which is
easily solved by configuring the monitoring process to issue non-secure accesses.
Workarounds for these cache-based issues usually rely on an hypervisor managing the trans-
lation process of its guests, in order to ensure there are no mismatched cacheability attributes.
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Figure 5.4: Example of a cache-based attack
The most effective way of dealing with this would be to disable caching of the normal world,
but, as mentioned, this would come at a very high performance cost for non-secure software.
Alternatively, an hypervisor could clear the cache contents before executing trusted code, which
also presents a big performance decrease, or otherwise guarantee that all locations accessed
by non-secure software are mirrored by the secure-software, i.e., that secure software issues NS
accesses to memory locations accessible by non-secure software. The latter would require hy-
pervisor maintenance of both secure and non-secure page tables or an implementation of level-2
translations, so that the non-secure guest has a reduced view of the system restricted to the
non-secure memory sections.
A different solution may be implemented in the second cache level with the introduction
of locking capabilities that are also TrustZone-aware. As mentioned, locked entries cannot be
evicted by line fill requests and, as such, are not susceptible to the mentioned attack types.
Level-2 TrustZone-enabled cache controllers can restrict the locking of entries to accesses made
by secure software, making those locked secure cache lines impervious to the cache monitoring
performed by non-secure software.
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5.2.2 Maintenance Operations
The TrustZone extensions add some nuances to the cache maintenance operations, allowing
for world specific interactions that take into account the addresses’ NS tag. The policy dictates that
operations issued by secure software can affect both S and NS lines, while non-secure software
can only affect lines tagged as NS.
As with the TLB case, information on the implementation of processor side caches (L1 caches)
is scarce and does not answer some important questions around its inner workings, mainly con-
cerning execution in monitor mode and priority when executing secure sided operations. Table
5.2 presents the verified correlation between the affected cache lines and the execution state that
performed the maintenance operation. The results obtained are in line with the TLB findings,
where monitor mode executes as secure software, regardless of the SCR.NS bit.
Table 5.2: Cache Maintenance Operations From Different Sources
Affected Lines
Execution State Lines tagged as NS Lines tagged as S
Guest NS Yes No
Guest S Yes Yes
Monitor S Yes Yes
Monitor NS Yes Yes
Level-2 caches, on the other hand, do not present the same results. Since the L2 cache
controller is a memory mapped device, executing the maintenance operations is done by writing
to a dedicated addressable register. As such, the cache controller checks the security permissions
by evaluating the transaction security bit, i.e., if the register’s address was issued as a secure or
non-secure address. This means that secure software can effectively act as non-secure and issue
maintenance operations that only affect non-secure lines, by mapping the register accordingly
in its translation tables. This is a very useful feature mainly for the multi-guest virtualization
approaches previously mentioned, where the active guest always runs in non-secure mode, and
is kept in secure memory locations when inactive. In these implementations, the caches need to
be flushed every time a new guest starts execution, to enforce data isolation. If this feature was
Chapter 5. TrustZone Memory Subsystem: MMU/Caches 81
not available, every time the hypervisor, running in monitor mode, issued a clean command, it
would also clear its own cached addresses, which would negatively impact its own performance.
After answering the questions around monitor mode, the doubt about the eviction priority was
tackled. If secure software can clean all cached lines and we know that a secure and non-secure
line can be mapped to the same physical address, which of the two lines is written to memory?
Does this generate an error, or does TrustZone employ any priority algorithm that ensures the
secure line is always the value written to memory? Unfortunately, testing indicates that there
is no TrustZone-aware scheme when deciding which line to write in main memory. What this
means is that the contents which end up in main memory after flushing the whole cache are only
dependant of the current location in the cache and the controller’s maintenance policy, i.e., in
which order it clears the contents to memory. Since the two lines can be placed in the same sets
but in different ways (in a set associative implementation), without making use of cache locking
or coloring techniques, where the addresses are knowingly stored in determined cache locations,
the final memory value written to memory is never deterministic, being either the secure or the
non-secure copy. This further amplifies the relevance of the solutions presented in section 5.2.1
to remove instances of mismatched attributes describing the same physical address.
5.2.3 Interaction with TrustZone-IP
So far this section has analysed the cache subsystem on its own, only mentioning the inter-
action between the processor and the caches. Even though its relevant to make that analysis, to
better understand its nuances and vulnerabilities, and given that not every board implements a
fully TrustZone-enabled memory subsystem—as in the RaspberryPi 3B case— it is also important
to note that the cache interactions do not end with the L2 controller.
When the memory subsystem is equipped with TrustZone memory protection units, these
and the cache work in tandem to prevent some of the situations described in sections 5.2.1 and
5.2.3. Behind this interaction is the abort handling scheme implemented in Arm processors. As
previously mentioned, when a non-secure access tries to access secure memory, and external
abort is generated to the processor which can then halt execution and handle it the way is deems
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best. This is the result of the TrustZone-IP unit which is protecting the memory either triggering
an interrupt signal that is connected to the processor or, more commonly, by returning an error
(DECERR) in the AXI channel, which is interpreted by the processor as an external abort. When
using caches, if the address tag does not match the target region security state set by the Trust-
Zone IP, a line fill will result in no data pulled to the cache and a DECERR response will be sent
to the processor, while in the case of an eviction nothing is written to main memory but the line
is evicted from the cache and a DECERR response is also issued.
The relevance of mapping non-secure memory as non-secure accessible in secure page tables
is further emphasised in the presence of a TrustZone-IP unit that possesses a security inversion
mode, but the presence of these units also help mitigate the mismatch between the secure world
view and the TrustZone-IP region mapping. In these cases, where secure transactions cannot
access non-secure memory, ensuring secure software issues accesses complying with the target
region’s security state means reducing the number of aborts in the system. Even though it does
not strictly cross the architectural rules, TrustZone security aborts triggered by secure software
should not exist, as it sort of defeats the purpose behind the existence of two different worlds
where secure software is expected to be a reliable execution environment. On the other hand,
this security inversion mode prevents the existence of the same physical address on two separate
cache lines, by ensuring that a non-secure memory location can only be accessed by a non-secure
access, which reduces the vulnerabilities created by this duality approach taken by the TrustZone
extensions, as previously described.
5.2.4 Discussion
Running tests to the modifications introduced by the TrustZone extensions to the MMU and
cache models by using a dual-guest virtualization approach allows a clear verification of its duality
properties. Intrinsic to splitting the address space into two, these modifications are best suited
to accommodate two execution environments and, at first sight, the concept of running two OSes
atop of the same mirrored address spaces, where they can effectively each make use of the full
addressable space in an isolated manner, may seem like a great approach. Unfortunately, this
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would only be the case if at least one of the two guests was loaded into the cache and all of its read
or write transactions were redirected to the cache, never reaching the main memory subsystem,
otherwise creating an indeterministic and unstable environment. This can be accomplished if a
guest is small enough to be loaded into the cache, where it can then remain by using available
cache locking mechanisms provided by the L2 cache controller.
Given that the presented case is a very specific one, and taking into account that two com-
pletely distinct address spaces would hinder communication capabilities between VMs and with
external devices, there is a need to make sure the two address spaces can work in tandem with
each other. The easiest way to accomplish this is to make sure that non-secure memory is never
accessed by a secure transaction. To do so, the configurations set in TrustZone-IP units must
be reflected in the page tables used by the secure world, both by OS and monitoring software.
As described in this chapter, this approach is the one that mostly reduces the attack surface for
cache exploits, while also getting rid of possible TrustZone security aborts generated by secure
world software that would also harm performance.
If tweaked with these changes, the approach described in the first paragraph could actually
be successful, without hindering communication from the guest locked in cache. Supposing this
was the non-secure guest, its communication could be implemented as a system call that would
prompt secure software to fetch information from a pre-defined location and then transmitting it
to the desired destination, provided that the pre-defined location was described with a non-secure
tag in the secure page tables. This way, the secure guest would retrieve data from the non-secure
cache lines and distribute it to where it deemed fit. An approach like these can also be employed
in boards that do not possess TrustZone-IP securing the main memory subsystem to enforce
isolation among VMs without having to deploy more complex page table layouts. Since the non-
secure guest would never reach main memory, this could be considered as secure. How feasible
or in what cases this might be employed is very dependant of the guest and board specifications,
but its still something that might be of value to further analyse.
Unfortunately, when talking about a TrustZone-assisted multi-guest virtualization approach,
working with caches is not very efficient, and the workarounds to the challenges are not very
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evident, when talking about a system with no hardware support for two-level translation. Running
all guests from the normal world while the inactive VMs are kept in secure memory is relatively
straight forward, when no caching is involved. But, when the guests are allowed to save data in
caches, there is a need to flush the non-secure cache contents every time there is a context switch.
Otherwise, guests would have access to each others data, corrupting the isolation between VMs.
Without employing a software based two-level translation regime, where the hypervisor would
have to ensure each guest only accesses memory allocated to them, this problem persists. In
(Martins et al., 2017), the authors show that guest performance can drop more than 20% when
compared to their native execution, when using a sub 1ms guest switching rate, due to this need
to flush cache contents. This issue is solved in devices that possess hardware support for two-
level translation, which is the case for Armv8-A devices or devices with virtualization extensions. In
these devices, addresses can be tagged according to the VM that accessed them, preventing VMs
from accessing locations to which an hypervisor deems they have no permission to. As such, one
could say that TrustZone-assisted multi-guest hypervisors are as viable as single or dual-guest
implementations in these boards but this seems sort of unfair, as the extensions that would
make these approaches as viable would be the virtualization extensions and not the TrustZone-
extensions. This does not mean that multi-guest TrustZone-assisted hypervisors are unusable but
rather that they will demonstrate much higher performance degradation when compared with the
more classical approaches.
The performance deterioration present in multi-guest TrustZone-assisted virtualization solu-
tions, coupled with the introduction of the Armv8-A architecture, might shift the usage of TrustZone
back to a more security-oriented panorama. With the addition of hardware support for two-level
address translation to the base architecture, no longer being provided as optable virtualization
extensions, and given that register banking between the secure and normal world is also removed
in the Armv8-A architecture, the benefits of using TrustZone as the foundation for a virtualiza-
tion solution no longer seems as prevalent, given the proliferation of Armv8-A devices. As one
of the first points made in this document, the impetus to implement hypervisors based on the
TrustZone extensions was the large availability of boards with these extensions when compared
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with VE-enabled devices. But, following the increasing complexity of software solutions, Arm now
provides better ways to implement these more complex systems, such as in the case of multi-
guest virtualization, with TrustZone providing the backbone of system-wide security. Although not
entirely reliant on this technology, virtualization solutions deployed in Arm devices will still work
in tandem with the security extensions to provide reliable execution environments, and will have
to abide to the TrustZone policies mentioned in this thesis, at least until the next version of the
security extensions.
6. Conclusion
When the Arm TrustZone security extensions were announced, a few researchers saw an op-
portunity to bring virtualization solutions to a wider range of devices, enabling the deployment of
virtualized environments where until then it was not viable to do so. As the interest grew around
this technology, more devices were developed with diverse approaches to the implementation-
defined TrustZone subsystem. Different manufacturers building different implementations meant
that constraints within TrustZone functionalities also varied, and that what was possible in one
implementation may not be true in a different one. Along with the general lack of concise informa-
tion around this technology, grasping its possibilities and limitations can prove to be challenging,
with no hub for reliable condensed information.
This thesis attempted to help fill the information gap around this technology, mainly focus-
ing on the TrustZone memory subsystem. Firstly it covered the protection units that are used
in different boards for protecting the main memory subsystem—the larger memory blocks con-
nected to the boards through a dedicated controller—,to better portray which properties a system
software programmer has available when deploying a TrustZone-assisted virtualization solution,
and how these may influence the development or execution of said software. It identified four
main properties, in the form of granularity of securable regions, what security profiles can be
defined, how dynamically can their security parameters be configured and who has permission
to change them. Three board implementations were reviewed, using the LTZVisor as a software
platform on top of which tests could be carried out. These showed that there is variety in the
implementations, with the Zynq-7000 board clearly prioritizing security and determinism, while
the i.MX6 board implemented a very flexible but more fallible approach and the Ultrascale+ board
presenting a more balanced implementation.
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The second part of this thesis targeted the changes introduced by the TrustZone security ex-
tensions to the virtual memory subsystem of MMU and caches, that are crucial for the deployment
of a virtual memory system architecture. The division between two separate address spaces was
explained, along with the duality introduced to the cache lines that allows the same address to ex-
ist in two separate cache lines at the same time. The advantages and drawbacks of these design
choices were presented from an isolated and then a more in context point of view, reviewing how
they can improve performance but also how they can be exploited to illegally extract information
that should be secure. Finally, the problems this architecture presents to the implementation of
multi-guest TrustZone-assisted virtualization were discussed, presenting the facts that make this
approach less than ideal, given the introduction of the Armv8-A architecture, which helps mitigate
the problems created by multiple guests sharing the cache contents.
After ending the last chapter, the notion that TrustZone-assisted virtualization has reached its
full potential in the form of single and dual-guest approaches, which take full advantage of the
dual world separation introduced by this technology, is ever present. Even so, all of the concepts
reviewed remain of critical understanding, as future virtualization solutions based on Arm systems
will have to work in tandem with the security extensions in order to provide a robust execution
environment, as the concepts of extensions for virtualization and security become once again
separate but now in a more intertwined manner.
This document ends up providing a small compilation of TrustZone information, both from re-
viewing existing documentation and by actually experimenting with the diverse implementations.
This will hopefully create a source for anyone trying to understand how a TrustZone-enabled mem-
ory subsystem is implemented and what options there are for doing so, as well as presenting some
good practices that should be followed when developing software in a TrustZone environment.
On a more personal note, this thesis was a new type of challenge to develop. As a more
theoretical work, the way of thinking and planning were quite different from the projects developed
so far, as there was a need to figure out not how to reach a certain result but rather how the
obtained results can be used to figure out how the TrustZone features are actually implemented.
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6.1 Future Work
Extending this work means reviewing the biggest number of different implementations avail-
able, in order to widen the discussion around the advantages and drawbacks that each approach
presents. This would allow manufacturers to have a larger set of information to draw from when
designing new devices, as well as creating a bigger discussion pool so that future improvements
to the technology can be applied.
From a virtualization standpoint, the sense is that the Armv8-A technology and its embedded
virtualization extensions are the way to keep growing these solutions. As such, it is relevant to
study how the findings of chapter 5 translate to a scheme where each cached address can still
only exist as secure or non-secure but access to it can be managed for each VM by the translation
process. Does this change reduce the attack surface of cache-based attacks or does it only
improve performance? In the last few years, caches have been the target of many attempted
exploits and study of countermeasures that do not hinder performance seems to be relevant in
the research community. This is a topic that, given the increased vulnerability that has been
identified in the duality property of TrustZone-aware caches, also seems like a relevant subject to
pursue.
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